Multilinks deliverable 4.3

Intergenerational family responsibility and solidarity in Europe

Katharina Herlofson, Gunhild Hagestad, Britt Slagsvold
& Anne-Mette Sørensen

Norwegian Social Research (NOVA)

April 2011

Table of contents

1. Introduction ... 3
2. Public opinion and the family-society balance of responsibility ... 7
   - Welfare state profiles ... 7
   - Substitution or complementarity? ... 8
   - How the family-society balance is measured ... 10
   - The balance of care responsibilities ... 11
   - The balance of financial responsibilities ... 14
   - Care versus financial assistance and old versus young ... 15
   - Balancing responsibilities: summing up ... 16
3. Intergenerational family responsibility in the east and west of Europe ... 20
   - Earlier research ... 20
   - Family variations across Europe ... 22
   - Intergenerational responsibilities: norms or attitudes? ... 23
   - Measuring filial and parental responsibility ... 24
   - Support for intergenerational family responsibilities *across* countries ... 25
   - Support for intergenerational obligations *within* countries? ... 32
   - Intergenerational family responsibility and actual support exchanges ... 40
   - Conclusion ... 45
4. Filial responsibility: attitudes and actual support provision in Norway and The Netherlands ... 47
   - Norway and The Netherlands: two countries with high service levels ... 49
   - Samples and measures ... 49
   - Normative beliefs and responsiveness to increasing parental needs in The Netherlands ... 51
   - Filial responsibility: attitudes and support behaviour among Norwegian sons and daughters ... 54
5. Changes in attitudes to filial responsibility in Norway ... 58
   - Age, cohort or period effects? ... 58
   - Individual or family level effects? ... 59
   - Earlier research ... 60
   - Sample and measures ... 63
   - Decreasing agreement with filial responsibility ... 63
   - Changes in individual and family circumstances and support of filial responsibility ... 69
   - Summing up ... 72
6. Grandparents: role expectations and role enactment ... 73
   - Is there a grandparenthood role? ... 73
   - The Norwegian grandparenthood role in a comparative perspective ... 75
   - Substitution or complementarity? ... 79
   - Summing up ... 80
7. Conclusion ... 82
8. References ... 85

Appendix ... 95

1. Introduction

The aim of work package 4 of the EU-FP7 Multilinks project (www.multilinks-project.eu) is to study variations in support for family obligations within and across countries, to examine the relationship between attitudes towards family responsibility and actual provision of support, and to explore the impact of family and health changes on attitudes and support patterns. In the present Multilinks deliverable (deliverable 4.3), we review a number of analyses which have been carried out within the framework of work package 4.

The analyses presented are mainly based on data from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), which is part of the Generations and Gender Programme of the UNECE. Data from ten countries are currently available (January 2011): Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Georgia, Hungary, The Netherlands, Norway, Romania and Russia[1]. As the Austrian survey did not include questions about family obligations, data from Austria could unfortunately not be used in the analyses presented here. For the longitudinal analyses, data from Norway (The Norwegian Life-course, Ageing and Generations Panel study –NorLAG) and The Netherlands (The Netherlands Kinship Panel Study – NKPS) are used. Both NorLAG and NKPS (second waves) are part of the Generations and Gender Programme. The national surveys were carried out among representative samples of community-based people aged 18-79 years. Sample sizes vary from 8,161 in The Netherlands to 14,881 in Norway. The data collections were carried out in 2004 in Bulgaria and Russia, in 2005 in France and Romania, in 2006 in Georgia, in 2006-2007 in The Netherlands, and in 2007-2008 in Norway.

Some contextual details about the countries participating in the Generations and Gender Programme are given in table 1 below. The countries differ in terms of demography, health, economy, and social policy. Norway has a GDP per capita (65,204 US dollars) which is nearly the double of the GDP in Germany and France. The GDPs in the eastern countries are considerably lower than any of the western ones. The three western countries also have more generous health policies, as they spend 17-18 per cent of their total government expenditure on health, whereas the eastern countries use 12 per cent or less. There is an 11-

[1] For guidelines about sample design and documentation of survey instruments, see UNECE (2005). For documentation of concepts and design of the survey, see UNECE (2007). Both publications are available at http://www.unece.org/pau/ggp/Welcome.html. Documentation of the national data collections is currently available for some of the participating countries: e.g. Germany (Ruckdeschel, Ette, Hullen, and Leven 2006), Norway (Lappegård and Veenstra 2010).

year difference in female life expectancy (at birth) across countries, ranging from 83 years for women in France, to 72 years in Russia. The variation in male life expectancy is even greater. There is an almost 20-year difference from Norway on the top with 77 years and Russia at the bottom with only 58.5 years. Population ageing is most pronounced in Germany where there are far more individuals aged 65 and older than children under 15 years (132 persons aged 65 and older per 100 children under 15). Also in Bulgaria there are more people 65+ than children aged 0-14 (125). At the other end we find Norway with 74 old people (65+) per 100 children aged 0-14, The Netherlands (77) and Georgia (78). The most generous services for the old are found in Norway. The country has the highest share of persons aged 65 and older living in care institutions (12%) or receiving home based care (18%). In the eastern countries, 3% (Hungary) or less (Romania, Bulgaria and Russia) of the population 65+ are living in care institutions (and no information is available regarding recipients of home based care). It is important to note that the two Norwegian rates (% living in care institution and % receiving home-based care) can not be summed up. The institutional care rate reported in the Multilinks database, includes different types of residential care (which may also be called "assisted-living-dwellings). As described by Huber and colleagues (2009), in the Scandinavian countries different housing arrangements (adapted individual flats with care services included) have been developed (see also Szebehely 2005), which has "blurred the frontiers between home care and institutions" (Huber et al. 2009, p. 73). If a strict definition of institutional care is adopted (as Huber et al. does), the rate for Norway would be around 6 per cent, and the total coverage (institutional care in the strict sense plus home-based care) would be around 25 per cent for the 65+ (Huber et al. 2009), and 48 per cent for the 80+ (Daatland et al. 2010).

Child care for young children (under the age of 3) is most extensive in France, with a coverage rate of 43, and Norway (37%), whereas the rates in Hungary and Bulgaria are 6 and 7 per cent respectively. Finally, Norway stands out as the only country without any legal obligations between adult generations. In Hungary and Romania, there are no legal obligations towards parents, and obligations towards adult children are restricted to children who are still studying. The Dutch have obligations towards adult children, but not towards parents, whereas the opposite is the case in Russia and Georgia. Germany and Romania are the two countries with the most extensive obligations, as individuals are legally responsible for both parents and adult children (see table 1).

Table 1. Contextual details for the GGS countries.

	Norway	The Netherlands	Germany	France	Hungary	Romania	Bulgaria	Russia	Georgia
GDP per capita (US$) (2005)[1]	62,204	39,190	33,883	35,105	10,911	4,567	3,552	5,326	1,484[a]
General government expenditure on health as % of total government expenditure (2005)[2]	17.9	13.2	17.6	16.6	11.1	12.4	12.1	10.1	5.9
Life expectancy at birth (M/F) (2000-2005)[3]	76.8/81.8	76.3/81.0	75.8/81.4	75.8/83.1	68.3/76.6	67.8/75.1	68.7/75.6	58.5/71.8	68.0/75.0
Number of persons 65+ per 100 children under 15 (2005)[3]	74	77	132	89	101	94	125	91	78
% of persons 65+ living in care institutions[4]	11.7	7.5[b]	4.3	6.5	3.0	0.1	0.8	1.1	-
% of persons 65+ receiving home based care[4]	18.0	12.3	7.1[c]	6.1	-	-	-	-	-
Coverage rate for children under 3 (kindergarten)[4]	37.0	14.5	10.2	43.0	6.0	-	7.0	20.0	12.0
Legal obligations towards parents[4]	no	no	yes	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes
Legal obligations towards adult children[4]	no	yes	yes	yes[d]	yes[d]	yes	yes[d]	no	no

Sources and notes:

[1] GDP: gross domestic product. International Monetary Fund (2010). [2] World Health Organization (2008). [3] United Nations Population Division (2009). [4] Multilinks Database on Intergenerational Policy Indicators. Data mainly for 2004, but reference year might deviate somewhat (Keck, Hessel, and Saraceno 2009). Note that the care institution rate and the rate for home-based care can not be summed up as in some countries as some persons live in types of care institutions where they receive home-based care (see text for more information).

[a] GDP for Georgia is based on estimations for 2005 made by the IMF staff. [b] As reported by Visser-Jansen and Knipscheer (2004), see Keck, Hessel, and Saraceno (2009). [c] The percentage refer to services subsidised by the longterm-care insurance (see Keck, Hessel, and Saraceno 2009). [d] Legal obligations of parents only as long as adult children are still studying .

We start out this work package 4 deliverable with a cross-national study of attitudes towards the family/society balance of responsibility (chapter 2). Here we build on, and extend, earlier analyses carried out by Daatland, Slagsvold and Lima (2009). Secondly, we present the results from a study of how various demographic characteristics affect adherence to intergenerational responsibility norms (chapter 3) (see also Slagsvold and Daatland 2008, Slagsvold et al. 2009, Daatland, Herlofson and Lima 2011). We then continue with a presentation of findings from longitudinal studies in The Netherlands (Dykstra and Fokkema 2009) and Norway (Herlofson, Slagsvold, and Lima 2009) of the correlation between attitudes towards filial responsibility and actual provision of support by adult sons and daughters (chapter 4). Subsequently, we examine changes in filial responsibility support and the impact of health and family changes on attitudes over a five-year period in Norway (chapter 5). The last study presented is an analysis of grandparental role expectations and enactment in various European countries (chapter 6) (e.g. Hagestad and Herlofson 2009, Hagestad and Herlofson 2010, Herlofson and Hagestad 2011).

2. Public opinion and the family-society balance of responsibility

In all modern welfare states, responsibility for the old and the young is shared in some form between the family and the state. Other actors, such as voluntary organisations, neighbours and friends, usually play a modest role (Daatland and Herlofson 2003a). Depending on the country, welfare states may take a larger or a smaller share of the responsibility. However, there is not only a difference in levels, but also in *which* resources are distributed (e.g. financial assistance versus care) and to *whom* (elders versus children). The aim of this chapter, however, is to focus on public opinion – how citizens of various western and eastern European countries feel that responsibilities for care and financial assistance should be shared between the family and the society.

Welfare state profiles

In order to understand better the family/state division of responsibility to the old and the young, Saraceno (2010, 2011) and Saraceno and Keck (2010) have distinguished four different types of policy regimes, building on the conceptual frameworks of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), Korpi (2000) and Leitner (2003): 1. *Familialism by default* (unsupported familialism): welfare states where there are no public alternatives to family care, nor financial support for such care. 2. *Supported familialism*: when families are financially compensated for meeting their financial and caring responsibilities. 3. *De-familialisation*: welfare states where family responsibilities and dependencies are reduced through publicly provided care services and financial transfers. 4. *Optional familialism*: an option between supported familialism and de-familialisation. Saraceno and Keck (2010) point out that very few countries follow the same approach to responsibility upwards (towards the old) and downwards (towards the young). Policy regimes are usually mixed. In Norway, for example, welfare state responsibilities for children can be considered a mix of de-familialisation (relatively high daycare coverage for children under 3 years of age) and supported familialism (long parental leaves and a cash-for-care option when children are 1-2 years of age). As for responsibilities towards the old on the other hand, the Norwegian pattern is typically one of high de-familialisation because of generous public service levels. Norway stands in strong contrast to for example Bulgaria, where both upwards and downwards responsibilities are characterised as familialism by default (i.e. very few alternatives to family care).

In a discussion of welfare state profiles, it is also important to remember that in many European countries, individuals are obliged by law to support parents and/or adult children. Among the countries included in GGP, Norway stands out as the only country with no such obligations (see table 1 in the introduction). The Dutch are responsible for adult children by law, but not for parents. In France and Bulgaria, legal obligations towards adult children are restricted to the education period. The French are also responsible for parents, but this is not the case for Bulgarians. Legal obligations in Germany and Romania go both ways – up generations, towards parents, and down generations, towards adult children. Finally, in Russia and Georgia, adult children are legally responsible for their parents, but parents are not responsible for their adult children.

Substitution or complementarity?

Because of contrasts in welfare state profiles, the actual balance of responsibility between the family and the state has been found to differ substantially across countries. However, it is fair to say that Wolfe's theory about "the moral risk of the welfare state" (i.e. that family members' moral obligation to provide mutual support will be corrupted if alternative support sources outside the family are made available) (Wolfe 1989) has been proven wrong. A number of studies have demonstrated that families are highly involved in care provision also in so-called generous welfare states (e.g. Daatland and Herlofson 2003a, Ogg and Renault 2006, Sundström, Malmberg, and Johansson 2006). In fact, it has been demonstrated that welfare state with a care partnership between families and well-developed public services seem better able to meet the needs of old people than what is the case for low service countries, where the family has to carry to care burden more or less alone (Daatland and Herlofson 2004, Motel-Klingebiel, Tesch-Römer, and Kondratowitz, 2005). In a country like Norway, where services are complemented by family care, the total coverage rate (public services and family) among frail old is higher than in Spain and Germany where service levels are considerably lower (Daatland and Herlofson 2004). Furthermore, Künemund and Rein (1999) have shown how available welfare state services *crowd-in* rather than *crowd-out* families, encouraging rather than discouraging family help. Their conclusion is that a generous welfare state reinforces rather than undermine family solidarity.

When comparing actual provision of help across countries, it is however, important to distinguish between *how many* receive or provide support and *how often* support is received or provided. Although family members tend to step in when needs arise independently of the level of welfare state services, the frequency of help provision may vary greatly across countries. Ogg and Renaut (2006) have studied support exchanges among adult children born in 1945-54 based on SHARE data. They find that about 40 per cent of adult children who belong to these birth cohorts in Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands provide help to their parents (and/or in-laws). [2] The same is the case for about 25 per cent in Italy, Spain and Greece (and also Austria and France). When the authors only consider daily (or almost daily) help, however, the pattern changes – less than 10 per cent of Swedish, Danish and Dutch support-giving offspring provide help on a daily basis compared to as many as 55 per cent in Spain, and almost 40 per cent in Italy and Greece (and Austria). A similar illustration has been given by Brandt, Haberkern and Szydlik (2009), based on the same dataset (SHARE). Significantly more children provide help with housekeeping to their old parents in the north compared to in the south (about one third compared to circa 15 per cent), but twice as many provide the more demanding personal care in the south compared to in the north (9-10 per cent versus 4-5 per cent). Albertini and colleagues (Albertini, Kohli and Vogel 2007) also consider intergenerational financial exchanges and reach the same conclusion: transfers are less frequent but more intense in southern Europe than in the Nordic countries, and Continental European countries are somewhere in between the two (p. 332).

Substitution versus complementarity of services and family care, or crowding-in versus crowding-out, may also be reflected in public opinion about the proper division of responsibility and personal preferences. Family responsibility is believed to have a stronger back-up in countries with a more familialistic orientation than in northern Europe (Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008) and vise versa for welfare state responsibility. In their analysis of responsiveness to parental needs in individualistic and familialistic countries, Kalmijn and Saraceno used data from Eurobarometer on attitudes about upward intergenerational support (towards parents). The ranking of the countries included show a clear north-south gradient, with the southern European countries (Greece, Spain, Italy) being considerably

[2] At least one of the following types of help: personal care, practical household help and/or help with paperwork.

more supportive of adult children's responsibility towards old parents than what is the case in the north (Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands). Also, compared to Germany and Spain, public opinion in Norway is much more in favour of a state responsibility for the care of the aged and much less supportive of family responsibility (Daatland and Herlofson 2003b). This north-south contrast in support for state responsibility is confirmed by Haberkern and Szykdlik (2010). Whereas only 9 per cent of the Greek believe the state should be the main responsible for elder care functions, 90 per cent of the Danish feel the same.

The findings reported above are in line with Reher's (1998) argument that family cultures follow a north-south gradient with kinship ties being considerably stronger in the south than in the north. Reher emphasises differences in preferences for co-residence: a clear majority in Southern Europe express a preference for moving in with an adult child when they are no longer able to live by themselves, whereas the same is the case for only a minority in northern Europe. According to Daatland and Herlofson (2003b), less than one fourth of old Spanish people (75+) would prefer residential care (if no longer able to live by themselves in old age), compared to 90 per cent of old Norwegians.

How the family-society balance is measured

The following analysis of public opinion about the family-society balance includes the following countries: Norway, The Netherlands, France, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia and Georgia. The data were obtained from the Generations and Gender Programme Data Archive in January 2011 (see Introduction for more details). Austria, Germany and Hungary could not be included as their questionnaires did not cover the issues examined here.

Opinions about the proper division of responsibility are measured by questions about whose task it is to care for and financially support the old and the (very) young. The questions were phrased as follows: "There are widely varying views on how we should care for people in our society. Please indicate for each of the topics mentioned whether you think (your own opinion) it is mainly the task for society, the family or both:

- to care for older people in their home
- to care for pre-school children
- to care for schoolchildren during after school hours

- to provide financial support for older people who live below subsistence level
- to provide financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level"

Response categories were from 1) "mainly a task for society" to 2) "more a task for society than for the family", 3) "a task for society and the family equally", 4) "more a task for the family than for society", and finally 5) "mainly a task for the family". "Society" is here taken to mean the welfare state. The responses are not only indicative of how the responsibility should be balanced between the family and the society, but also illustrate priorities between care and cash (financial assistance) and between old and young.

The balance of care responsibilities

Figure 2.1 shows the public opinion about the balance of responsibility regarding care for old people who live at home and are in need of assistance. All countries, except for two (Norway and The Netherlands), lean towards a family responsibility in this respect. In Georgia, less than five per cent feel that it is more a societal than a family duty and more than 50 per cent state that this is mainly a family responsibility. Also in France, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia, few support the idea that the society should be more responsible than the family to care for old frail people living at home (10-17%). In Norway on the other hand, less than one per cent of the respondents think that this is mainly a task for the family. Seemingly, the Dutch are even more in favour of a societal responsibility than are the Norwegians. This may, of course, be the case, but one should note that the question was phrased somewhat differently and the response categories did not include the middle alternative (equal responsibility) as an option (see notes, figure 2.1). In Norway, 1 out of 4 is of the opinion that care for old persons living at home should be shared equally between the society and the family.

Figure 2.1 Opinion about the family-society responsibility for care of old persons at home, by country.



Notes: In The Netherlands both the question and the response categories were phrased somewhat differently. The question did not specify old persons *at home*, but referred to old people in general. Also, the division of responsibility was between the family and the government (not society). Finally, the middle response category (equal responsibility between the two parties) was not an option in the Dutch survey. *Source*: GGS, N=74,093.

What about care for children? The GGS includes two questions about the division of responsibility between the family and the society for the young – one for children under school age (figure 2.2) and one for schoolchildren during after school hours (figure 2.3). We see that, compared to care for the old, a considerably larger proportion in all countries feel that care for children is more a family responsibility than a task for the society. In Georgia and Romania, only a small minority (around 10 per cent) is of the opinion that the society should play a part in taking care of children. Around 70 per cent feel that this is mainly a task for the family. Norwegians, on the other hand, are considerably more inclined to leave the responsibility of child care to the society. However, also in Norway a large share feels that such care is more a family than a public responsibility (40-50 per cent). This is the case despite the fact that in Norway, daycare coverage rate for children under 3 is relatively high (see table 1 in Introduction) and all schools are obliged to offer after-school arrangements for children under the age of 11. France has a kindergarten coverage rate which is among the highest in Europe. Still, the majority (more than 60 per cent) sees the family as holding more responsibility than society for the care of the young. Only around 10 per cent feel that

the society should be more responsible. The Bulgarian and Russian patterns are fairly similar to the French one.

Figure 2.2 Opinion about the family-society responsibility for care of children under school age, by country.



Figure 2.3 Opinion about the family-society responsibility for care of schoolchildren during after school hours, by country.



Notes (figure 2.2 and 2.3): In the Dutch survey questions and response categories specified “government” and not the society. The questionnaire did not include the middle response category (equal responsibility between the two parties). *Source*: GGS, N=73,963.

The balance of financial responsibilities

Who should be responsible for financial support to old persons and to young parents who live below subsistence level? As we see in the following two figures (figures 2.4 and 2.5), in all countries financial assistance of this type is considered to be much more a societal than a family responsibility. Even Georgians, who consider care responsibilities for both the old and the young to be almost exclusively a family responsibility, lean heavily towards a societal responsibility for financial assistance to deprived old people and young families. Only around 15 per cent of Georgians regard this type of assistance to be more a family than a societal responsibility. Norwegians stands out as the least family oriented in this respect – less than five per cent regard the family as more responsible than the society for financially supporting old persons and young parents who live below subsistence level. The country with the highest share who considers this type of support as more a family than a societal task, turns out to be France with around 20 per cent. However, a considerably larger share of the French sees the society as the responsible (circa 50 per cent). The remaining are of the opinion that the responsibility should be shared equally between the two parties.

Figure 2.4 Opinion about the family-society responsibility for supporting financially old persons living below subsistence level, by country.



Source: GGS, N=66,621.

Figure 2.5 Opinion about the family-society responsibility for supporting younger people with children who live below subsistence level, by country.



Source: GGS, N=66,469.

Care versus financial assistance and old versus young

Above, we have presented results for public opinion about the family versus society responsibility in five domains: care for old people in their home, care for pre-school children, care for children during after-school hours, and finally financial assistance to young parents and old people who live below subsistence level. All in all, Norwegians leave more of the responsibility to the society, whereas Romanians and Georgians are more inclined to see the family as mainly responsible.

Figures 2.1 to 2.5 not only show the balance between family and societal obligations across countries, but also illustrate how popular opinion defines responsibilities for the old versus the young, as well as the balance of financial versus care duties. In all countries, there is considerably greater consensus that society is more responsible for financial protection than social (i.e. care). This is also seen in historical developments, first pensions, than care (Scharf 2010).

In Norway for example, where popular opinion leans heavily towards societal responsibility, 71 per cent states that care for old persons living at home is more a responsibility of the society than of the family, whereas the same is the case for 90 per cent when it comes to financial assistance to economically deprived old. Among Georgians, who are least in favour of societal responsibility, less than 5 per cent are of the opinion that care for the old (in their homes) is more a societal than a family duty. However, when asked about the responsibility for old persons living below subsistence level, almost fifty per cent feel that the society has a greater responsibility than the family. The difference in the relative weight of cash (financial assistance) versus care is even greater when we look at responsibilities for the young. In all countries, popular opinion leans towards family responsibility when it comes to care for children under school age (figure 2.3) and care for school children during after school hours (figure 2.3). When asked about financial assistance to young families, the opposite is the case. In all countries, a majority points towards the society as the (main) responsible (figure 2.5).

What about the responsibility for old people versus children? According to popular opinion, child care is clearly more a family responsibility than care for old persons. The balancing of responsibility for financial assistance to younger people with children versus old people is less clear. There seems to be a tendency that the French and the Norwegians view the society as somewhat more responsible for the old than for young families, whereas the opposite is the case in the Eastern countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Russia and Georgia).

Balancing responsibilities: summing up

Based on responses to the five items, we have calculated an additive index which ranges from -10 (total family responsibility) to +10 (total societal responsibility), with the middle category 0 representing an equal share of responsibility between the two parties. Figure 2.6 sums up the results by showing mean scores for the various countries on this index.

Figure 2.6 Opinion about the balance of family-society responsibility. Additive index.*
Mean scores.



Source: GGS, N=66,042.

When combining care for the old and the young with financial assistance to economically deprived old people and young families, as we do in the index, Norway stands out as the country, among the six included here, which clearly lean in the direction of societal responsibility (+3.02). This probably reflects the fact that the Norwegian welfare state is characterised by a rather high degree of *de-familialisation* through extensive public services to both the old and the young, as well as financial transfers, which reduce family responsibilities and dependencies. Also, Norway is the only country where adult family generations are not legally obliged to support each other. Leaning towards societal responsibility does, however, not imply a unison support for a total societal responsibility. A mean score of +3 is far from a *mainly* societal responsibility which in the index equals a score of +10. As shown in the figures above (figures 2.1-2.5), Norwegians do feel that the family should take its share of responsibility, in particular when it comes to care of children. The conclusion of earlier studies is that family members in Norway also complement services in *actual* support provision, both in help to frail parents (Daatland and Herlofson 2004,

Daatland, Veenstra and Lima 2009) and in child care by grandparents (Hagestad and Herlofson 2009, Hagestad and Herlofson 2010b. See also chapter 6 of the present report).

At the opposite end of the continuum, we find two countries that are characterised by *familialism (by default)*: Georgia (with a mean score of -3.29) and Romania (-2.88). To our knowledge, no cross-national study of division of support responsibilities has so far included east European countries. According to Robila (2004), research on family issues in the eastern part of Europe is in fact limited. Also, in the Multilinks intergenerational policy indicator database (Keck et al. 2009) relevant data on welfare state services are missing for some of the eastern countries (due to difficulties in obtaining comparable data). Consequently, table 1 (in the introduction) does not include complete care rates for Georgia and Romania. For Romania, only the care institution rate is included, which is extremely low – only 0.1 per cent of the population 65+ live in care institutions. According to De Vos and Sandefur (2002), old Romanians often live with their children, and those who live in institutions are almost exclusively childless. Turning to care for the young, it has been pointed out by several scholars how policies have changed after the collapse of communism (e.g. Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006, Szelewa and Polakowski 2008). Earlier, mothers were offered affordable publicly provided childcare services in other to encourage them to enter the labour force. The tendency after the collapse has been the contrary – many child care centres have been closed and women are enouraged to leave the labour market to raise children. The kindergarten/day care coverage indicator shows that Georgia has a coverage rate of 12 per cent for children under the age of 3, which is considerably lower than the rates in France and Norway, but higher than the one in Bulgaria. The rate is unfortunately not available for Romania. Older data (from 1997), however, show a very low Romanian coverage rate for the under threes, only 1-2 per cent (Rostgaard 2004). Based on available information, we find it fair to say that the actual division of responsibility in Norway on the one hand, and in Romania and Georgia on the other, is to a certain extent reflected in public opinion about the proper balancing of responsibility in these three countries. In Romania and Georgia, families should have almost total responsibility for care, but financial assistance to old people and young families living below subsistence level should be a societal responsibility, according to popular opinion. Whether it is possible for the society to take on a financial responsibility, is another question. As documented by The International Monetary Fund (2005), more than 50 per cent of the population live below subsistence level in Georgia.

Poverty has been described as serious problem also in Romania (Molnar et al. 2006). The Romanian poverty rate is considered to be the highest in Europe (United Nations 2004), according to Molnar (2010), those suffering the most are the young (aged 0-15).

Perhaps the most surprising finding is the one for France (-1.09). Although family members are legally responsible for parents, and for adult children as long as they are enrolled in the education system (see table 1 in the introduction), France stands out as a de-familialised country (Saraceno and Keck, in press). The responsibility for elder care used to be carried mainly by the family, but has since the 1990s increasingly been shared between the state and the family (Jönsson et al. 2011). As for child care services, France has even been described as a continental European “overachiever” (Rauch 2007), with coverage rates (kindergarten/day care) among the highest in Europe. Still, more than 6 out of 10 French respondents are of the opinion that the family is more responsible than the society for child care. Almost 50 per cent feels that the same is the case for home-based elder care. Financial assistance to deprived old and younger people with children is more a societal responsibility, but still, France has the highest proportion feeling that the main responsibility should be carried by the families (figure 2.4 and 2.5).

The Netherlands could not be included in the index (figure 2.6) as the Dutch questionnaire did not include all response categories and questions about the balance of responsibilities between the family and the society. However, it seems fair to say that public opinion also here can be seen as a reflection of the actual division of responsibility. The country has, as Norway, a rather high coverage of institutional and home-based care (Cooney and Dykstra 2011, Huber et al. 2009), and is therefore considered *de-familialised* by the classification provided by Saraceno and Keck (2010) in terms of elder care. Care for young children on the other hand, is more characterised by *familialism (by default)* as day-care coverage for young children is rather low. Similarly, according to public opinion, around 80 per cent regard the *society* as more responsible than the family for elder care, almost 70 per cent feels that the *family* is more responsible than the society for child care.

In the next section we will discuss family obligations more in detail by focusing on views regarding both upward (towards parents) and downward (towards adult children) responsibilities in the various GGP countries.

3. Intergenerational family responsibility in the east and west of Europe

Above, we analysed the balancing of responsibility between the family and the society as expressed in public opinion across Europe. In this chapter we turn to two specific aspects of family obligations: adult children's responsibility to care for frail parents and parents' responsibility towards adult children (see also Slagsvold et al. 2009, Van Bavel et al. 2010, Daatland, Herlofson og Lima 2009). The aim is to explore how people in various European countries regard responsibilities up and down the generational line and to analyse the relationship between views on family responsibility and actual giving and receipt of support.

Earlier research

Filial responsibility has been of interest to social scientists for several decades. Initially, the main reason for this interest was the concern that the modernisation of society and the subsequent loosening of traditional norms and values, would make younger generations abandon their parents once they became frail and in need of help. One of the oldest studies dates back to the early 1940s, and here Dinkel (1944) did in fact conclude that the obligation of children to support aged and needy parents was no longer a well established norm among young Americans. According to Dinkel, young adults assigned more importance to their personal relations with parents than to filial responsibility, when deciding whether or not they should provide help, a conclusion that was echoed in the writings of Janet Finch about fifty years later (Finch 1989, Finch and Mason 1990).

The aim of most publications on filial responsibility has been to analyse the normative support of such responsibility in the population, and to describe variations between different groups in the strength of the support. The findings from previous studies have, however, to a large extent been inconclusive. For example, Wake and Sporakowski (1972), as well as Burr and Mutchler (1999) reported no evidence of an *urban-rural* difference in the endorsement of filial responsibility. Dinkel (1944) and Lee, Peek and Coward (1998) on the other hand, found rural residents to be more inclined to support filial responsibility compared to urban residents. Yet, Sauer, Seelbach and Hanson (1981) concluded the opposite. As for *gender* differences, in some studies women have been found

to be more supportive of filial responsibility than men (e.g. Seelbach 1977; Stein *et al.* 1998; de Valk and Schans 2008), whereas in others no significant differences between men and women has been demonstrated (e.g. Burr and Mutchler 1999; Lee, Peek and Coward 1998; Logan and Spitze 1995; Wake and Sporakowski 1972; Wolfson *et al.* 1993).

The OASIS study (Old age and autonomy: the role of service systems and intergenerational family solidarity), was the first to provide cross-national data on filial responsibility. Not only did the participating countries (Norway, England, Germany, Spain and Israel) differ in the level of endorsement of filial obligations, but certain demographic characteristics turned out to have different impact on the support as well (Daatland and Herlofson 2003a, 2003c). As for the effect of gender, men in Norway and England were more supportive of filial responsibility compared to women, but in Germany, Spain and Israel gender differences were small or non-existent. Furthermore, having children was negatively associated with filial responsibility among the oldest (respondents aged 75 and older) in Norway and England, but showed a positive association among old Germans.

Findings from previous cross-sectional analyses of the relationship between views on filial responsibility and actual receipt and provision of support also vary (see table 8 in Appendix for an overview). In some studies a positive correlation is found: providers and/or receivers of support have a higher score on filial responsibility compared to those who are not involved in support exchanges) (e.g. Klein Ikkink, van Tilburg and Knipscheer 1999, Silverstein and Litwak 1993, Stein *et al.* 1998). Lee and colleagues (1994), as well as Peek *et al*. (1998), on the other hand, conclude that the relationship between endorsement of filial responsibility and actual support (here: receipt of support) is not significant. The results from the OASIS study confirm this somewhat inconsistent pattern: older respondents (75+) with family help scored higher on filial responsibility compared to those without such help, but only in Spain and Israel and not in Germany, England and Norway (Daatland and Herlofson 2003a). Recently, Cooney and Dykstra (2011) have conducted a study on family obligations and support behaviour in the United States and the Netherlands among middle-generation adults, which adds to this pattern: Views on family obligations were correlated positively with support to parents in the US, but not in The Netherlands (no significant correlation).

There may be several reasons for the contradicting findings reported above. Previous studies vary in time and place, as well as in sample size and ages and generational position of

the respondents. In addition, different measures of family responsibility have been employed in the various studies.

When intergenerational family obligations are studied, scholars most often focus on filial responsibility – adult children's responsibilities towards old parents. We know very little about the opposite – parents' responsibility towards adult children. With few exceptions (De Vries, Kalmijn and Liefbroer 2009; Finch and Mason 1993), the term parental responsibility nearly always refers to parents' responsibility for *small* children. But people do not grow out of the parent role as they age, and parents may feel concern and responsibility for children as long as they live. As Rossi and Rossi (1990) have observed, parents very often maintain helping patterns long after the children grow up. The present contribution extends earlier studies by including analyses of both upwards (filial) and downwards (parental) responsibility between adults, and by adding eastern European countries to the analyses (see also Daatland, Herlofson and Lima 2011).

Family variations across Europe

The countries included in the present analyses are Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Romania, Russia, France, Germany, Norway and The Netherlands (data accessed in January 2011, see the introductory part for more details). The Hungarian survey only included the filial responsibility items, not the parental responsibility items. The Dutch questionnarie included two of the four items for filial responsibility, and one of the two parental responsibility items. Data from Austria have recently been relased, but the Austrian survey did not include any of the family responsibility items.

Little is known about differences between western and eastern European families. Contrasts between families in the north and the south of Europe on the other hand, have been studied considerably more often (e.g. Blome, Keck and Alber 2009, Dykstra and Fokkema 2011, Hagestad and Herlofson 2007, Hank 2007, Höllinger and Haller 1990, Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008, Kohli and Albertini 2008, Reher 1998). Previous research has described how family ties in southern Europe are closer and more collectivistic than what is the case in the north (e.g. Reher 1998). A similar argument was made in the 1960s for the eastern relative to the western family (Hajnal 1965). As pointed out by Daatland and colleagues

(2011), the strength and character of family responsibilities are hardly produced by geography itself, although climate and living conditions may have had an impact on family patterns and living arrangements. Differences are probably more likely to be rooted in history and religion (Höllinger and Haller 1990, Reher 1998). Influences from the Roman Empire may also be observed, for example in family and inheritance laws. Later, political events may have had an impact on the family, such as the two World Wars, followed by the Cold war (Daatland, Herlofson and Lima 2011). Authors emphasising family culture, as represented by Reher (1998), Hajnal (1965) and others (e.g. Laslett 1983), are not explicit about which dimensions of family ties that are stronger or looser (family norms, affection, support exchanges, contact patterns, e.g. Bengtson and Roberts 1991). In the present discussion, we concentrate on the normative dimension (see also Daatland, Herlofson and Lima 2011 and Van Bavel et al. 2010).

Intergenerational responsibilities: norms or attitudes?

In the literature on intergenerational support responsibilities, it is common to describe such obligations as norms that may have varying degrees of support in a population. The question is, however, whether it is more fruitful to consider that the two scales (filial and parental) as tapping into attitudes rather than norms in some societies. Norms and attitudes differ in that norms are a group-level phenomenon, requiring consensus, and having an element of social control. Attitudes, on the other hand, express personal evaluations of a given issue. Considering the way the questions about intergenerational support are phrased in both scales with "ought to" or "should", it is possible that people will respond with reference to shared norms rather than individual evaluations. However, the less explicit the norms are held in a given society or group, the more the responses probably reflect individual evaluations, i.e. personal attitudes.

Following theories of individualisation and modernisation, one might hypothesise that in more modern societies, with greater autonomy, weaker traditional socialisation institutions, and more developed welfare state services, ideas about intergenerational family responsibilities may more often be based on social identity and personal preferences than what is the case in other more traditional societies (Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007). It is also

possible that the two scales may reflect attitudes rather than norms for subgroups of a population, so that for example the young and the highly-educated may be more likely to express attitudes than what is the case for old people or the less educated.

We should expect that if the scales measure social norms about intergenerational obligations, then the variation in a society should be small because consensus about the obligations to support old parents or adult children is high. If, on the other hand, the scales measure attitudes, then the variation should be greater as there is little overall consensus. Some people do support the idea that one should be held responsible for family members, whereas others do not. Among the nine countries included in the analyses presented here, we expect filial and parental responsibility to reflect relative strong norms of support in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Romania, and Russia. In other words, we anticipate the mean level of support to be quite high and the variance in support quite low. In France, Germany, The Netherlands and Norway on the other hand, we expect the two scales to reflect attitudes towards intergenerational responsibilities, rather than norms. Some people will feel strong support, others not. This means that the mean level of support should be relatively low and the variance quite high.

Measuring filial and parental responsibility

The filial responsibility scale measures the degree to which respondents consider adult children to be responsible for supporting and taking care of aging parents in need of help. The scale is based on answers to the following four questions:

- Children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need.
- Children should adjust their working lives to the needs of their parents.
- Children ought to provide financial help for their parents when their parents are having financial difficulties.
- Children should have their parents live with them when parents can no longer look after themselves.

A scale based on answers to two questions measures parental responsibility:

- Parents ought to provide financial help for their adult children when the children are having financial difficulties.

- If their adult children were in need, parents should adjust their own lives in order to help them.

The response categories to all questions range from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. The scale score is the average score on the scale items. This means that both scales range from a low of 0 to a high score of 4, with higher scores indicating stronger support for the notion that adult children should support their parents or that parents should support their adult children. For The Netherlands, the filial responsibility scale is based on two questions, the first and the last listed above, while parental responsibility is measured by the question on parents’ obligation to provide financial help for adult children in need.

Support for intergenerational family responsibilities *across* countries

Filial responsibility

The mean levels of support for the notion that adult children should help and support their parents are presented in table 3.1. The first two columns in the table report the mean and standard deviation for the scale based on all four items, while the last two columns report those figures for the scale based on the two items that are also available for The Netherlands. Looking at the results for the four-item scale, it is evident that there is a great deal of variation from country to country. The level of support is highest in Georgia with a mean score of 3.22 (out of 4), and lowest in Norway with a mean score of 1.58. It is also the case that the variability is small in Georgia and large in Norway. It should be noted that all the observed country differences are statistically significant. In the three western countries with well-developed welfare states, i.e. France, Germany and Norway, it is indeed the case that support for filial responsibility is lower, but much more variable, than in the other countries. This is in line with our hypothesis. It is noteworthy though, that the level of support in France and Germany is not that much lower than in Hungary and Romania. Only Norwegians show little support for the notion that adult children should help and support their parents. In the five eastern countries with less well-developed welfare states, the level of support is, as expected high, and the standard deviation low, suggesting that filial responsibility is a norm enjoying widespread support. In Hungary, however, we see the lowest level of support among east European countries and a much higher variability. This

would seem to indicate that filial responsibility has limited support in this country. A similar pattern of country differences emerges when using a measure of filial responsibility based on the two items which are also available for The Netherlands. More importantly, The Netherlands is clearly similar to Norway with low level of support for filial obligations and a relatively high level of variability.

Table 3.1. Mean scores and standard deviations on two versions of the filial responsibility scale (0-4), by country.*

	Four items		Two items	
Country	**Mean score**	**Standard deviation**	**Mean score**	**Standard deviation**
Norway	1.58	.92	1.64	1.02
The Netherlands	-	-	1.80	.83
Germany	2.35	.72	2.58	.78
France	2.10	.90	2.42	1.08
Hungary	2.52	.88	2.34	.97
Romania	2.69	.54	3.01	.64
Bulgaria	2.80	.55	3.09	.60
Russia	2.95	.54	3.08	.60
Georgia	3.22	.51	3.33	.54

Support for individual items in the filial responsibility scale

The mean score on the filial responsibility scale provides a simple way to compare the nine countries, but it is also of interest to examine the level of support for each of the items making up the scale. Figures 3.1 to 3.4 do just that (see tables 1a to 1d in Appendix for more details).

Figure 3.1. Agreement with “Children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when the parents are in need”, by country.



Figure 3.2 Agreement with “Children should adjust their working lives to the needs of their parents”, by country.



Figure 3.3. Agreement with “Children ought to provide financial help if parents are in financial difficulty”, by country.



Figure 3.4. Agreement with “Children should have their parents live with them when parents can no longer look after themselves”, by country.



Note: In The Netherlands, only the first and the last filial responsibility item were included in the survey questionnaire.

There is almost universal agreement in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Russia, and virtually no disagreement with the statements “Children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when the parents are in need”, and “Children ought to provide financial help if parents are in financial difficulty”. These statements also receive a great deal of support in Hungary, France and Germany. In Norway and The Netherlands, however, less than half agree with the first statement, and about half of the Norwegian respondents agree with the second. The pattern of support for “Children should adjust their working lives to the needs of their parents” is very different. First, in Bulgaria and Romania a substantial minority disagrees with the statement. The disagreement is not as large as in France, Germany and Norway, but it is nonetheless noteworthy. In France and Norway, four out of five respondents disagree; in Germany fifty percent do so. The idea that “Children should have their parents live with them when parents can no longer look after themselves” receives overwhelming support in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Russia. Very few disagree in these four countries. The level of support is also high in France and Germany, but here, a significant percentage disagrees or is neutral. Among the Dutch and the Norwegians only a small minority agrees.

The responses to the separate items that make up the filial responsibility scale demonstrate very clearly that there are strong norms in support of the idea that adult children should support aging parents in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Russia, whereas the support is considerably more mixed in the other countries. This is, of course, especially pronounced in Norway and The Netherlands.

Parental obligations

The level of support for the notion that parents should support their adult children is shown in Table 3.2. The support is weaker in France, Germany and Norway than in the eastern European countries. Georgia has the highest level of support; Norway the lowest, exactly the pattern we observed in the case of filial obligations. But there is a greater variability in the support for parental obligations in all countries. This suggests that the nearly unison support we find for filial obligations in the eastern European countries is not present here, except in Georgia. The obligation to support adult children should probably not be considered a strong norm in six of the seven countries for which we have data. While there are many who

support the idea, there are also many who do not. As was the case for filial obligations, The Netherlands is more similar to Norway than to any of the other countries.

Table 3.2. Mean scores and standard deviations on two versions of the parental responsibility scale (0-4), by country.

	Two items		One Item	
Country	**Mean score**	**Standard deviation**	**Mean score**	**Standard deviation**
Norway	1.89	.89	2.18	.98
The Netherlands	-	-	2.07	.98
Germany	2.31	.82	2.68	.88
France	2.47	1.00	3.05	1.03
Hungary	NA	NA	NA	NA
Romania	2.58	.76	2.85	.76
Bulgaria	2.54	.80	2.72	.84
Russia	2.61	.74	2.75	.78
Georgia	3.16	.58	3.25	.57

Agreement with the two items making up the parental responsibility scale is described in figure 3.5 and figure 3.6:

Figure 3.5. Attitudes toward "Parents ought to provide financial help for their adult children when the children are having financial difficulties", by country.



Figure 3.6. Attitudes toward "If their adult children were in need, parents should adjust their own lives in order to help them", by country.



The level of agreement with the notion that parents should provide financial help for adult children in need is relatively high in all countries except in The Netherlands and Norway. In these two societies quite a few people disagree, but even more are neutral (neither agree nor disagree). There is much less agreement with the statement "If their adult children were in need, parents should adjust their own lives in order to help them". Not surprisingly, few respondents in Norway agree, and over 40 per cent disagree. The level of disagreement is also very high in France and Germany, whereas moderate levels of disagreement are found in Bulgaria, Romania and Russia. It is only in Georgia that the vast majority of respondents are in agreement with this item.

Summing up

The level of support for filial and parental responsibility is highest in the eastern European and lowest in the western European countries. This is consistent with the notion that in societies with well developed welfare states, family responsibility is weaker. It is also clear that two countries, Norway and The Netherlands, show significantly lower levels of support

than respondents in France and Germany. This may well reflect the actual level of governmental support (i.e. opportunity) provided in these societies.

We argued earlier that views on filial and parental responsibility might reflect either norms or attitudes. The analyses presented here, show that filial responsibility is clearly more of a norm in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Russia, than in France, Germany, Norway and The Netherlands. In the last four societies, there is a great deal of variability in the level of support. Some people express strong support, but quite a few do not.

Support for intergenerational obligations *within* countries?

We now turn to asking whether there are groups of respondents within each of the nine countries that are more or less in agreement with filial and parental obligations. We use multiple regression models to address this issue. The analyses include the following variables: gender, age, education and employment. In addition, we include a number of variables describing the respondent's family situation: has a mother alive, has a father alive, lives with a partner, ever divorced, has children, whether or not s/he lives with parents, and whether the parents ever divorced.

Gender is relevant for analyses of intergenerational obligations because of the different roles played by women and men in child and elder care. As noted above, previous studies have reported different effects of gender. Usually, when significant differences are found between men and women, women are usually found to be more positive to family responsibility compared to men. However, an earlier European study found the opposite effect for Norway and England with men being more positive (Daatland and Herlofson 2003a, 2003c). *Age* (chronological) is included in order to assess whether support for family responsibility varies across different age groups. As most earlier studies of filial responsibility only include certain age groups (the old, the young, or the middle generation), and analyses of parental obligation is rare, little is know about age effects from previous research (see table 8 in the appendix for an overview of earlier studies). *Education* consists of obligatory, secondary, and higher (college/university degree and higher) education (here: higher education = 1). Educational attainment is an indicator of social class and socio-economic status. It has been argued that working and lower class families hold stronger filial

obligations because of their need to be self-reliant (Connidis 2010). Another argument is that the higher educated hold more individualistic and less family oriented attitudes. Employment status (*in labour force*) includes both full-time and part-time workers, and is included in the models as work may represent a competing obligation to intergenerational care responsibilities. Three dichotomous variables are included indicating the respondents' family status: availability of a *partner*, parents (*mother living, father living*) and *children*. The analyses also include a variable indicating whether or not respondents *live with parents.* Finally, divorce is included, both parental divorce (*parents divorced*) and respondents' own divorce (*ever divorced*). Intergenerational family solidarity may be at risk when families break up and therefore divorce is often expected to lead to lower feelings of family responsibilities (e.g. Daatland et al. 2009, Ganong and Coleman 1999). However, a recent analysis of data from The Netherlands, does not confirm this expectation, rather the contrary – divorced people, as well as adult children of divorce seem to express stronger feeling of obligations (Wijkmans and Van Bavel 2010).

As the effect of some of the various independent variables included are found to be non-existent in some countries, positive in others and negative in yet others, we shall approach the analyses with an open mind without developing specific hypotheses. We do expect, however, that the question whether there are groups of respondents that are more or less in agreement with family obligations, is more pertinent in societies where there is a great deal of variability in the support, i.e. in societies where the filial and parental responsibility scales measure attitudes rather than norms. In the other societies, we expect few, if any, significant differences between different groups.

The results of the analyses are summarised in table 3.3 for filial responsibility and in table 3.4 for parental responsibility. The means of the variables included in the regression models are listed in the Appendix (table 3) (see also tables 4 and 5 the appendix for more details of the the multivariate analyses).

Filial responsibility

In the previous analysis, we concluded that there was strong support for filial responsibility and little variability in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Russia. The regression models for these four eastern European countries explain, as expected, very little of the (small) variance in the filial responsibility scale (table 3.3, see table 4 in appendix for more details). Women

are more supportive of filial responsibility than men in Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia. In Georgia, men and women do not differ. Older people are more supportive in Romania, but in the other countries there is no age effect. Respondents with higher education are less supportive in Bulgaria and Romania; in Russia and Georgia there is no effect of education. Being in the labour force matters for support of filial responsibility in Bulgaria, Russia and Georgia (negative effect). Thus, the effects of gender, age, education and labour force status show no consistent pattern across these four societies. The pattern of effects of the variables measuring the respondent's family situation is somewhat more consistent. Living with a partner and having mother living have no effect on filial responsibility in any of the four countries, and living with one or both parents have a positive effect. Having children has no effect, except in Russia (positive effect). Having divorced has a negative effect, but not in Russia, and having parents who divorced also has a negative effect, but not in Georgia and Russia. The most consistent finding in the regression models for the four eastern European countries is that the models do a very poor job of explaining the (small) variation in the dependent variable. This is consistent with the suggestion that the support for filial obligations in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Russia reflects shared norms.

In the country comparisons we found that Hungary is a society with relatively high levels of support for the notion that adult children should support and help their parents, but also a great deal of variability in that support. This puts Hungary in a position between the four eastern European societies where filial responsibility is a strong norm and France, Germany and Norway where there is a lower overall level of support for this type of responsibility and a great deal of variability. Reflecting the higher variance in the filial responsibility scale in Hungary, the regression model does a somewhat better job of explaining that variance than was the case in the 'strong norm' societies, although the explained variance remains rather low at 3%. In Hungary, there is no effect of gender, a positive effect of age and higher education, and no effect of being in the labour force. Having a mother or father alive has a positive effect, having children has a negative effect and living with a partner has no effect. Having divorced has a negative effect, and the same is the case for having parents who divorced. Finally, living with parents has a positive effect. In sum, Hungarian respondents who are more supportive of filial obligations are older, well-educated, have one or both parents alive, have not been divorced, have no children, live with parents, and have parents who have not divorced.

In France, Germany and Norway, support for filial responsibility is lower than in the east of Europe, and the regression models do a somewhat better job of explaining the variance in filial responsibility. This is especially the case in Norway, where the explained variance is at 15%. In France it is 5% and in Germany 3% (which is the same as in Hungary). Gender has a negative effect on filial responsibility in all three countries with women expressing less support compared to men. Age has a negative effect in Norway only, higher education has a positive effect in Norway, a negative effect in Germany and no effect in France. Being in the labour force has a negative effect in all three countries. Having a mother living matters in Norway and Germany, while having a living father matters in Germany only (positive effect). Living with a partner and having been divorced have negative effects in France and Germany, but not in Norway. Having children has a negative effect in all three countries. The same is the case for having divorced parents. Finally, living with one or both parents has a positive effect. For the Netherlands, we estimated the regression model using the scale with just two items as the dependent variable. As can be seen in the column for The Netherlands in table 3.3 above, the effects of gender, age, higher education, and being in the labour force are negative. Living with a partner and having children also show negative effects. Living with one or both parents has a positive effect in all other countries, whereas in The Netherlands, there is no effect of this variable. Turning finally to divorce, in the majority of the countries, respondents who have ever divorced or have divorced parents are less supportive of filial responsibility than those who never divorced. In The Netherlands, there is no effect of either two.

In the following tables (3.3, 3.4, 3.7 and 3.8), we indicate directions of associations that are statistically significant at the 5 % level, as well as the overall explained variance of the multivariate models (adjusted R^2). Due to large sample sizes, also modest associations can be statistically significant and we recommend the Appendix (tables 4-7) for more detailed information about estimates (unstandardised coefficients), standard errors and levels of significance.

Table 3.3 Summary of regression results for filial responsibility, by country.

Variable	NOR	NLD*	DEU	FRA	HUN	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Gender	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	NS
Age	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS	**pos**	**pos**	NS	NS	NS
Higher education	**pos**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**pos**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS
In labour force	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**
Mother living	**pos**	NS	**pos**	NS	**pos**	NS	NS	NS	NS
Father living	NS	NS	**pos**	NS	**pos**	NS	NS	**neg**	NS
Has partner	NS	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Ever divorced	NS	NS	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**neg**
Has children	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**pos**	NS	NS
Lives w/parents	**pos**	NS	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**
Parents divorced	**neg**	NS	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS
Adj. R^2	.15	.08	.03	.05	.03	.01	.01	.003	.002
N	13,428	7,315	8,703	8,314	12,777	11,754	12,057	9,217	9,858

Notes: BGR=Bulgaria, GEO=Georgia, HUN=Hungary, ROU=Romania, RUS=Russia, FRA=France, DEU=Germany, NOR=Norway, NLD=The Netherlands (ISO 3166-1 alfa-3).

NS=Not significant.

*For The Netherlands, the filial responsibility scale only includes two items.

There are a few common threads among the four western European countries where we consider support for filial responsibility to reflect variation in attitudes rather than a norm. In all four, we find that women are less supportive than men. Parents are also less supportive compared to non-parents. People who are employed are less supportive than those who are not in the labour force. Those who do not live with parents are less supportive than those who do, except in The Netherlands. If age has an effect, it is negative (in Norway and The Netherlands). This means that younger people are more supportive of filial responsibility than older people in these two countries. Having divorced has a negative in Germany and France, but no effect in Norway and The Netherlands. Having experienced parental divorce has a negative effect (except in The Netherlands where there is no effect).

Higher education has a significant effect in three of the countries, but it is positive in Norway and negative in Germany and The Netherlands.

Summing up

The multivariate analyses show that in the four eastern European societies there is broad based support for the notion that adult children should provide help and assistance to parents in need. Therefore, the regression models fare rather poorly at explaining variations in filial responsibility. The fact that some effects are significant should not be accorded much weight. In France, Germany, Norway and The Netherlands on the other hand, the regression models were considerably better at explaining variations in filial responsibility. In all four western European countries, women were less supportive than men, the employed less supportive than those who are not in the labour force, and parents less supportive than non-parents. But these were the only factors that had the same effects in the four societies. Four factors had either a negative effect or no effect, namely age, having a partner, having divorced and having parents who divorced. Living with parents, which is far less common in the four western countries (see table 3 in appendix), had a positive effect, except in The Netherlands.

Parental responsibility.

It was clear from the earlier analysis that there is more variability in the support for parental responsibility in the eastern European countries. In other words, parental responsibility seems not to be the broad based norm that filial responsibility is in this part of Europe. The exception is Georgia. The question we ask next is whether there are some groups that are more supportive than others within each country. We estimated regression models similar to the models for filial responsibility. The results of the multivariate analyses are summarised in table 3.4 (see table 5 in appendix for details). The results for The Netherlands are based on a regression model using just one item as the dependent variable.

Table 3.4. Summary of regression results for parental responsibility by country.

Variable	NOR	NLD*	DEU	FRA	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Gender	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age	NS	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	NS	NS	**pos**	NS
Higher education	**pos**	**neg**	**neg**	**pos**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS
In labor force	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**
Mother living	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	**neg**	NS	NS
Father living	NS	NS	NS	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	NS
Has partner	NS	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Ever divorced	**neg**	NS	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**neg**	**neg**
Has children	NS	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**
Lives w/parents	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	NS	**pos**	**pos**	NS	NS
Parents divorced	NS	**pos**	NS	NS	NS	**neg**	**neg**	NS
Adj. R^2	.06	.08	.03	.05	.01	.02	.03	.003
N	10,159	7,317	8,827	8,400	11,754	12,078	9,229	9,858

Notes: BGR=Bulgaria, GEO=Georgia, ROU=Romania, RUS=Russia, FRA=France, DEU=Germany, NOR=Norway, NLD=The Netherlands. Hungary is not included as the Hungarian survey questionnaire did not include the parental responsibility items.

*For The Netherlands, parental responsibility is based on one single item.

NS=Not significant.

The broad based support for parental responsibility in Georgia (see figures 3.5 and 3.6 above) means that the regression model has very little variance to explain and does poorly at it (0.003%). It makes no sense commenting on the few significant effects for this country. In the other three eastern countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia, the regression models explain between 1% and 3% of the variance. Higher education and being in the labour force have a negative effect in all three countries. Respondents who have children are more supportive than are non-parents, and people living with one or both parents also are more in agreement with parents' obligation support towards adult children in need of help

and support, except in Russia. It is noteworthy that gender has no effect in any of these countries, and that age only has an effect (positive) in Russia.

In France, Germany, Norway and The Netherlands, the regression models explain between 3% and 8% of the variance in parental responsibility. Women are less supportive than men in all four countries, as was also the case for filial responsibility. Being in the labour force also has a negative effect. Older people are more supportive than younger in France, Germany and the Netherlands, but not in Norway, and parents are more in agreement with parental responsibility than non-parents, except in Norway. The effect of higher education was negative in three Eastern European countries; this is also the case for Germany and The Netherlands. In France and Norway on the other hand, the highly educated are more supportive of the notion that parents ought to support adult children in need of help. Having divorced parents does not have any effect in France, Germany and Norway, but in The Netherlands it has a positive effect. Having divorced oneself on the other hand, has a negative effect in three of the four western European countries (the exception is The Netherlands), as well as in the eastern countries (except Bulgaria).

Summing up

As was the case with filial responsibility, there is no simple pattern of consistent effects across the eight countries included in the analysis. But one factor plays a similar role in all the countries. Respondents who are in the labour force are less supportive of the notion that parents ought to support adult children in need. This is possibly because if you have a job, you are less likely to be in need of help, and maybe less likely to believe you may ever need it. This argument is also consistent with the finding that higher education has a negative effect in five of the seven countries. It leaves open the question of why respondents with higher education are more supportive to parental responsibility in France and Norway. Older people are more likely to support parental responsibility in Russia, France, Germany and The Netherlands, but not in the other countries. Respondents with children, who are more likely to find themselves in the situation of having to provide help to adult children, are also more supportive in all countries, except in Norway. Having divorced has a negative effect in most countries. Finally, it is noteworthy that there are no differences between women and men in the eastern European countries, but in Germany, France, Norway and The Netherlands, women are less supportive than men.

Intergenerational family responsibility and actual support exchanges

The last purpose of this chapter is to analyse the relationship between views on intergenerational family responsibility on one hand and actual exchanges of support on the other. As mentioned above, previous studies have reached different conclusions. Some report a positive correlation between the two (e.g. Klein Ikkink, van Tilburg and Knipscheer 1999, Silverstein and Litwak 1993, Stein *et al.* 1998), others do not find a significant relationship (Lee *et al.* 1994, Peek *et al*. 1998). Daatland and Herlofson (2003a) conclude that the correlation is significant and positive in some countries (Spain and Israel), but not in others (England, Germany and Norway). Furthermore, Cooney and Dykstra (2011) find no correlation between family obligations and support to parents in The Netherlands, but in the United States, the association was positive.

As pointed out by Ajzen and Martin (2005), an important condition for studying the relationship between attitudes and actual behaviour is that the two are measured on the same level. This condition is often not fulfilled in studies of attitudes and actual behaviour regarding intergenerational family responsibility. If one wants to study the correlation between attitudes towards *filial* responsibility, for example, and actual support, the most proper way would be to ask offspring with old parents about their views on adult children'a obligations to care for frail parents and whether or not they themselves actually provide such help and support. However, what has often been done is to ask parents above a certain age about what they feel adult children should do, and whether or not they have actually received support from their own children (e.g. Eggebeen and Davey 1998, Lee *et al.* 1994, Peek *et al.* 1998), or from family members in general (Daatland and Herlofson 2003a).

Here we analyse the two scales (filial and parental responsibility) separately with support provision and receipt up and down the generational line respectively (from older generations to younger and vice-versa). The types of support included in the Generations and Gender Survey are the following: help with child care, personal care, financial assistance and emotional support. Financial assistance and emotional support go both ways, meaning that these two types of support can be received from or provided to both older and younger generations. Help with child care goes down the generational line (provided to adult children with own children, or received from older generations), whereas the opposite is the case for personal care (provided to older or received by younger generations). Unfortunately, The Generations and Gender Survey does not include practical help, which would have been a

relevant type of support to include in our analyses. Hungary and The Netherlands had to be left out of the analyses as information about support exchanges for these two countries were missing or incomplete. We start out by showing correlations between family responsibility and actual support. For filial responsibility, we correlate with provision of support to older generations, as well as receipt of support from younger generations. The opposite is the case for correlations with parental responsibility (provision of support to younger generations and receipt of support from older generations). Thereafter, we repeat the analyses presented in table 3.3 and 3.4 above, adding provision and receipt of support.

Table 3.5 Bivariate correlations between *filial* responsibility and provision/receipt of support[a] by country.

	Norway	Germany	France	Romania	Bulgaria	Russia	Georgia
Support provision to older generations	.159**	.026*	.044**	.016	.014	.034**	.008
Support receipt from younger generations	-.220**	-.026*	-.063**	.019*	-.013	-.008	.000

Notes: [a]Types of support provided to older generations or received from younger generations includes emotional support, personal care and financial assistance.

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 3.6 Bivariate correlations between *parental* responsibility and provision/receipt of support[a] by country.

	Norway	Germany	France	Romania	Bulgaria	Russia	Georgia
Support provision to younger generations	.101**	.072**	.142**	.084**	.031**	.082**	.041**
Support receipt from older generations	-.069**	-.056**	-.114**	-.015	-.010	-.086**	-.030**

Notes: [a]Types of support provided to younger generations or received from older generations includes emotional support, help with child care and financial assistance.

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The correlation between filial responsibility and actual support shows the following: in western Europe, views on filial responsibility are correlated positively with provision of support

to older generations, and negatively with receipt of support from younger generations (strongest in Norway, weakest in Germany). The pattern is somewhat less consistent across the eastern European countries. The overall picture is that there is no correlation between the two, although in Russia, there is a positive correlation between filial responsibility and support provision (as in western Europe) and in Romania, there is a weak positive correlation with support receipt (contrary to western Europe). For parental responsibility and actual support, the European pattern is more or less the same: in all countries, views on parental responsibility are correlated positively with support provision to younger generations and negatively with support receipt from older generations (except in Romania and Bulgaria where there is no correlation).

In the final multivariate regression analyses we include support provision as well as support receipt (to and from older and younger generations respectively) (tables 3.7 and 3.8), controlling for the same variables as in tables 3.3 and 3.4 above. It is first of all important to note that adding intergenerational support provision and receipt in the filial responsibility regression model for the various countries hardly changes the adjusted R^2 (except in Norway where it increases from 0.15 to 0.16). This means that we do not explain (much) more of the variance by including these two variables in our model. When controlling for gender, age, education, labour force participation, family statuses and divorce, the associations between provision and receipt of support and filial responsibility score remain the same in Norway: a positive effect of support provision to older generations on filial responsibility score and a negative effect of support receipt from younger generations. In Germany and France, where the correlations were weaker than in Norway, there is no effect of support provision. The effect of support receipt on the other hand, remains negative in France, but not in Germany (no effect). In eastern Europe, associations between support and receipt of support and filial responsibility remain the same also when controlling for our background variables (no effect in Bulgaria and Georgia, positive (weak) effect of support provision in Russia). In Romania, there is a positive effect of support provision and no effect of support receipt on filial responsibility score (table 3.7).

Table 3.7 Summary of regression results for filial responsibility, including provision or receipt of support[a], by country.

Variable	Norway	Germany	France	Romania	Bulgaria	Russia	Georgia
Gender	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**pos**	**pos**	NS
Age	**neg**	NS	NS	**pos**	NS	NS	NS
Higher education	**pos**	**neg**	NS	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS
In labour force	NS	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**
Mother living	**pos**	**pos**	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Father living	NS	**pos**	NS	NS	NS	**neg**	NS
Has partner	NS	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	NS
Ever divorced	NS	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**neg**
Has children	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**pos**	NS	NS
Lives w/parents	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**
Parents divorced	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS
Support provision to older generations	**pos**	NS	NS	**pos**	NS	**pos**	NS
Support receipt from younger generations	**neg**	NS	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	NS
Adj. R^2	.16	.03	.05	.01	.01	.003	.002
N	13,387	8,339	8,300	11,740	12,235	9,203	9,844

Notes: [a]Types of support includes personal care, emotional support and/or financial assistance.
NS=Not significant at . ..

Moving on to parental responsibility (table 3.8), it is important to note that also here, the inclusion of provision and receipt of support does not improve the explained variance in the regression model noteworthy (only from 0.05 to 0.06 in France and from 0.01 to 0.02 in Romania). The association between support *provision* and attitudes towards parental responsibility are the same as what the bivariate correlations showed – significant and positive in all seven countries. As for *receipt* of support on the other hand, we found a negative bivariate correlation with parental support in the three western (France, Germany and Norway)

and two of the eastern European countries (Russia and Georgia). In the multivariate analysis, this association remains negative only in Russia and Georgia, and not in France, Germany and Norway.

Table 3.8. Summary of regression results for parental responsibility, including provision or receipt of support[a], by country.

Variable	Norway	Germany	France	Romania	Bulgaria	Russia	Georgia
Gender	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age	NS	**pos**	**pos**	NS	NS	NS	NS
Higher education	**pos**	**neg**	**pos**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS
In labor force	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**
Mother living	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	**neg**	NS	NS
Father living	NS	NS	**neg**	NS	NS	NS	NS
Has partner	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Ever divorced	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	**neg**	NS	**neg**	**neg**
Has children	NS	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**
Lives w/parents	NS	**pos**	NS	**pos**	**pos**	NS	NS
Parents divorced	NS	NS	NS	NS	**neg**	**neg**	NS
Support provision[a]	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**	**pos**
Support receipt[a]	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	**neg**	**neg**
Adj. R^2	.06	.03	.06	.02	.02	.03	.005
N	10,133	8,487	8,401	11,754	12,077	9,229	9,858

Notes: [a]Types of support includes help with child care, emotional support and financial assistance. NS=Not significant.

Conclusion

Previous comparative research on intergenerational family responsibilities has mostly dealt with responsibilities up the generational chain – adult children's obligations towards old parents. Here we have added downwards responsibilities – parents' obligations towards adult children. Also, earlier studies have focused on contrasts between the north and south of Europe. By including eastern European countries, the present contribution adds new empirical data to the description of intergenerational responsibilities in Europe.

Our analyses have revealed two different patterns, one for countries in the eastern part of Europe and one for the western part. The distinction between the two is particularly clear for filial responsibility. Differences may reflect culture as well as structure (opportunity), but it is difficult to assess which is what, as both work in the same direction (Daatland et al. 2011).

In Romania, Bulgaria, Russia and Georgia there is little variability, and demographic and family-related factors explain very little of the small variance in filial responsibility. The fact that this type of responsibility receives such widespread support may indicate that it should be considered a social norm – taking care of ones' parents when they become old and in need of help is well established and approved by the majority in these four countries. For example, around 70 per cent in Romania and Russia, 80 per cent in Bulgaria and 90 per cent in Georgia agree that adult children should have their parents live with them when they no longer can look after themselves. Support for parental responsibility is not as widespread in these countries, except in Georgia. However, compared to Germany, France, The Netherlands and Norway, downward responsibility clearly receives more support in eastern Europe, but the difference is less sharp than what was the case for upward responsibility. Hungary seems to stand with one leg in the east and one in the west. We found a relatively high level of support for filial responsibility among Hungarians[3], but also a great deal of variability in this support.

In the western European countries, particularly in Norway and The Netherlands, intergenerational responsibilities receive far less support than in the east. Many respondents, especially in Germany, express support for both upwards and downwards

[3] The Hungarian did not include the items for parental responsibility. Therefore, Hungary was only included in the analysis of filial responsibility.

family obligations, but quite a few do not. Also, demographic and family-related factors were considerably better at explaining variation in support of intergenerational obligations, in particular for filial responsibility. We conclude that neither filial nor parental responsibilies are well established norms in these societies, and to a considerable greater extent than in the east reflect personal attitudes. Norway and The Netherlands stand out as outliers being the two countries where intergenerational family responsibility receives the least support.

The inclusion of provision and receipt of support did not improve the explained variance noteworthy. In all countries, both western and eastern, providers of support are more positive to parental responsibility compared to non-providers. For filial responsibility, it matters considerably less if one provides support or not, except in Norway and Russia where providers are more positive than non-providers. Being a receiver of support on the other hand, has no effect, or a negative effect.

A main purpose of studying views on family responsibility is to gain knowledge about potential family support in the future. Using cross-sectional data for analysing the correlation between actual support exchanges and attitudes towards family responsibility norms is not ideal as we cannot make conclusions about the causal direction. Another limitation with the analyses presented above, is that the Generations and Gender Surveys only provide information about certain types of support (help with child care, personal care, financial assistance, emotional support), and not practical help. Findings from the cross-national OASIS study showed that being involved in exchanges of practical help was far more common than giving or receiving personal care, help with child care and/or financial support (Daatland and Herlofson 2004).

In the next chapter, we will follow up on this issue and present detailed analyses of the relationship between attitudes towards filial responsibility and actual support provision by using available longitudinal data from two of the countries participating in the Generations and Gender Programme: Norway and The Netherlands.

4. Filial responsibility: attitudes and actual support provision in Norway and The Netherlands

Above, we analysed and discussed how intergenerational responsibilities are related to various characteristics (e.g. gender, age, labour force participation, education, family statuses) in nine European countries. Norway and The Netherlands stood out as the two countries with the lowest support for both filial and parental responsibility. In this chapter we turn to longitudinal analyses from these two countries and ask: Do attitudes towards adult children's responsibility for frail parents predict future actual support provision among Dutch and Norwegian offsprings? (Dykstra and Fokkema 2009, Herlofson, Slagsvold and Lima 2009).

With few exceptions, previous analyses of the correlation between agreement with filial responsibility norms and actual support are based on data from cross-sectional studies (e.g. Klein Ikkink, van Tilburg and Knipscheer 1999, Lee, Netzer and Coward 1994, Peek et al. 1998, Silverstein and Litwak 1993, Stein et al. 1998). Also, it has been common to explore the issue from parents' perspective, and not from adult children's view (e.g. Eggebeen and Davey 1998, Lee, Netzer and Coward 1994, Peek et al. 1998, Silverstein and Litwak 1993) (see table 1 in the appendix for a detailed overview of previous publications). Although it may be of interest to analyse whether parents receive the help they feel they are entitled to from their children, it is not of particular relevance for political questions concerning future support from adult children to parents in need of help. In order to examine whether normative beliefs about filial responsibility are predictive of future support behaviour, longitudinal data based on adult children's perspective are more relevant. So far, only publications from one longitudinal study are available, namely the Longitudinal Study of Generations from Southern California (Silverstein, Parrott, and Bengtson 1995, Silverstein, Gans, and Yang 2006). In the first publication, Silverstein and his colleagues used data from three waves (1985, 1988 and 1991). They found that filial responsibility norms measured in the first wave (1985) did predict future provision of support to parents, but only for sons, and not for daughters, and only for the three year period (1985-1988), not over six years (1985-1991). About ten years later, Silverstein, Gans and Yang (2006) did a similar analysis based on data from the 1997 and the 2000 waves of the same study. Also here, a significant correlation was found between attitudes in the first wave and actual provision of support to

parents (mothers) three years later. This time, however, the correlation was only significant for daughters and not for sons, which stands in contrast to the findings presented in their 1995 publication.

The relationship between attitudes and behaviour is one of the most studied phenomenons in social-psychology. Originally, the fundamental assumption underlying the attitude concept was that attitudes guide, influence, and predict actual behaviour. This notion was, however, almost declared dead after a much cited review article which concluded that attitudes are "unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviours" (Wicker 1969: 65). Twenty-five years later, Kraus (1995) conducted a meta-analysis of more than 80 studies and found, contrary to Wicker's conclusion, that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is substantial. There is, however, great variability in the strength of the relationships, depending on a number of conditions (Banaji and Heiphetz 2010, Glasman and Albarracín 2006). One important condition is that attitudes and behaviour are measured on the same level (Ajzen and Martin 2005). More general, or global, attitudes may for example only be modestly correlated to specific behaviour. With few exceptions (e.g. Peek et al. 1998), research on filial responsibility is usually based on more global attitudes, and is explicitly or implicitly founded on the assumption that attitudes towards such responsibility predict future care provisions (e.g. Daatland and Herlofson 2003, Dinkel, 1944, Guberman et al. 2006, Lee, Netzer, and Coward 1994).

Previous analyses of the correlation between attitudes towards filial responsibility and actual support behaviour are usually based on cross-sectional parent-derived data. In the overview (table 4 in the appendix), we have reviewed 23 publications on filial responsibility. Of these 23, eleven include analyses of the attitude-support relationship. Two of the eleven employ longitudinal data, two only use data from adult children, and an additional two have data from both parents and children of the same family. Also, most of the publications are based on data from the United States. In the present contribution, we present the results from two European studies, one Norwegian and one Dutch. Both studies are based on longitudinal data from two waves of data collection. The Norwegian data are from adult offspring, whereas the Dutch have data from both adult children and their parents. The design of the two studies makes it possible to analyse the correlation between adult children's attitudes towards filial responsibility at the time of the first wave and their actual support provision at the second wave.

Norway and The Netherlands: two countries with high service levels

Both Norway and The Netherlands have rather extensive services for the old. As we see in table 1 in the introduction, among the GGP countries, Norway and The Netherlands have the highest shares of persons aged 65 and older who receive home-based care services, as well as the highest proportions living in care institutions. Furthermore, there are no legal obligations for adult children towards parents in the two countries. Few old Dutch and Norwegians (aged 80+) live with their children. Both countries have proportions living with children that are considerably below the EU average and very few would prefer to move into the home of a close family member if they required long-term care (Huber et al. 2009). Given the extensive public support system, most adult children in Norway and The Netherlands have the option to play only a minor role in the provision of support to parents in need of help. Nonetheless, among Dutch adults with parents aged 75 and older, almost 50 per cent report that they have provided help with household chores at least once during the last three months (Stuifbergen, van Delden and Dykstra, 2008). In Norway, around one third of adult children say they provide *regular* help (at least once a month) to parents in need (Herlofson, Slagsvold and Lima, 2009).

Samples and measures

The Norwegian data come from the Norwegian Life-course, Ageing and Generation Panel Study (NorLAG)[4]. So far, two waves of data collection have been carried out, the first one in 2002-2003 and the second in 2007-2008. In both waves computer-assisted telephone interviews and postal questionnaires were used. Data from public registries were added with the consent of the respondents. In the first wave, 5,589 respondents aged 40 and older were interviewed (67 per cent response rate). Among these, 75 per cent returned the mailed questionnaires. Of the original sample, 3,796 agreed to participate in the second wave five years later. For the analyses of attitudes towards filial responsibility norms at T1 (first wave) and actual provision of care at T2 (second wave), we selected a subsample consisting of respondents who participated in both waves, and who had at least one parent living at the time of the wave 2 interview (n=1,024). 22 respondents were removed because of missing

[4] For more information, see http://norlag.nova.no

information, reducing the sample to 1,002 adult children (548 daughters and 454 sons). 895 had mother and 455 had father living (Herlofson, Slagsvold and Lima 2009).

The Dutch study is based on longitudinal multi-actor data from the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study (NKPS)[5]. Data were collected for the first time in 2002-2003 (first wave, T1) and for the second time in 2006-2007 (second wave, T2). In addition to computer-assisted face-to-face interviews, data were collected by means of self-completion questionnaires. The sample for the analyses presented here consists of 777 adult children aged 50 and over, and a randomly selected father (n=292) or mother (n=485). The multi-actor design of the NKPS makes it possible to use reports from several family members in the analyses. In the present study, Dykstra and Fokkema (2009) included adult children's reports on attitudes to filial responsibility and actual support provision, as well as parents' reports on health and partner status.

The dependent variable, support provision to parents, was measured differently in the two countries. In the Norwegian study, it is a dichotomous variable (with the values 0 and 1) indicating whether or not adult children provide regular support to mothers and/or fathers (regular = at least monthly). The types of support include practical help (e.g. cleaning, house repairs, gardening, transport, shopping) and/or personal care (e.g. eating, getting up, dressing, bathing). In the Dutch study, support is a sum score (ranging from 0 to 10) based on five items and their frequency. The following types of support were assessed: two kinds of instrumental support (helping in the household and helping with odd jobs), two kinds of emotional support (showing interest and giving advice), and financial support (a monetary or material gift of 500 Euros or more). The answer categories include "not at all" (0), "once or twice" (1) and "several times" (2) in the past three months.

In both countries, attitudes towards filial responsibility were measured on the basis of a four-item scale. The four items, however, were phrased differently in the two countries (see table 4.1).[6]

[5] See http://www.nkps.nl/NKPSEN/nkps.htm

[6] The filial responsibility scale included in the first wave of the Norwegian study NorLAG was replicated in the second wave. In addition, the second wave also includes the filial responsibility scale used in GGS (see chapter 3 for more information about the GGS version).

Table 4.1 Filial responsibility – description of items, NorLAG and NKPS.

Norway (NorLAG)	The Netherlands (NKPS)
Adult children should live close to their parents so that they can help them.	Children who live close to their parents should visit them at least once a week
Adult children should be willing to sacrifice some of the things they want in order to support their ageing parents	Children should look after their sick parents
Older people should be able to depend on their adult children	Children should take unpaid leave to look after their sick parents
Parents are entitled to some return for the sacrifices they have made for their children	In old age, parents should be able to live in with their children

The Norwegian version was based on a scale developed by Lee, Peek and Coward (1998), whereas the Dutch was created for the NKPS. Both versions had five answer categories ('strongly agree', 'agree', 'neither agree nor disagree', 'disagree', and 'strongly disagree'). In both countries, questions about filial responsibility were included in the self-administered questionnaires (Liefbroer and Mulder 2006, NorLAG 2010)[7]. In both cases, the items were designed to assess general norms about filial responsibility, and not expectations of one's *own* support behaviour. The filial responsibility scale in the Dutch study ranges from 0 to 10, whereas the Norwegian version run from 0 to 8.

Both the Norwegian and the Dutch studies presented here, include the correlation between adult children's attitudes towards filial responsibility at the time of wave 1 and their support behaviour 4-5 years later (wave 2). The two studies vary, however, in how the analyses were carried out. Therefore, we present the results separately, starting out by summarising the work performed by Dykstra and Fokkema (2009), and then turning to the Norwegian analyses carried out by Herlofson, Slagsvold and Lima (2009).

Normative beliefs and responsiveness to increasing parental needs in The Netherlands

The purpose of the Dykstra and Fokkema study (2009) was to examine the conditions under which norms of filial obligations motivate adult children's support behaviour. The following research questions were addressed: 1. Do norms of filial obligation motivate

[7] The filial responsibility items for Norway were in both waves of NorLAG included in the self-administered questionnaires. In the second wave, the filial responsibility scale used in GGS (see the third part of the present deliverable) was included in the telephone interview.

intergenerational behaviour? 2. Is the quality of the parent-child relationship a stronger predictor of upward generational support than norms of filial obligation? 3. Is the responsiveness to norms of filial obligation greater in the event of increased parental needs? Multiple regression analyses were carried out to examine the provision of support to ageing parents at the time of wave 2. Both adult children's filial responsibility norms and their perceived quality of the relationship with parents were measured at wave 1. Analyses for mothers and fathers were performed separately.

Dykstra and Fokkema refer to the normative solidarity hypothesis (i.e. adult children who strongly support filial responsibility norms are likely to respond to the needs of their parents by providing support), as well as the individualisation hypothesis, which suggests that the perceived quality of the parent-child relationship is a more important factor (i.e. the better the relationship quality, the more likely adult children are to provide support when parents are in need). Dutch data are particularly interesting for studying adult children's support provision. First, the country has an extensive public support system. Second, the Dutch are highly individualised in terms of values. Consequently, as stated by the two authors, relationship quality may be more important than filial obligation norms for determining adult children's support behaviour.

Dykstra and Fokkema found that adult children with more positive attitudes towards filial responsibility in the first wave did provide more support to both mothers and fathers at the time of the second wave. A good perceived relationship quality was linked to more support provision in the case of fathers but not mothers. Adult children with parents who reported having poor health at wave 1, provided more support at wave 2. The same was the case for those with parents who experienced a change for the worse in health status between the two waves. More support was provided by adult children to mothers who were single at both waves, or who had lost their partner during the period between the two waves. Older offsprings were found to provide more support than younger, a finding which Dykstra and Fokkema attribute to the fact that they had older parents with greater needs. Daughters provided more support to both their mothers and their fathers compared to sons.

In the second model, interaction terms between filial responsibility and parental needs (change in parental need for support and change in partner status) were included, as well as between filial responsibility and the gender of the child. For support to fathers, none of the interaction terms turned out to be significant. For support to mothers, two of the

interaction terms reached levels of significance: Adult children with a strong support of filial responsibility were likely to provide increasing amounts of support to mothers with declining health. Also, sons turned out to be more responsive to filial responsibility norms than daughters (see table 6.2).

Table 6.2 Unstandardized regression coefficients predicting adult children's provision of support to non-coresident fathers (n = 292) and mothers (n = 485) in Wave 2.

	Fathers		Mothers	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Upward support in wave 1 (low-high)[a]	0.52***	0.53***	0.45***	0.45***
Filial obligations norms in wave 1 (weak-strong)[a]	0.14*	0.12	0.12**	0.25**
Relationship quality in wave 1 (not great-very good)[a]	0.40**	0.40**	0.11	0.11
Parental health in wave 1 (good-bad)[b]	0.48**	0.45**	0.35**	0.34**
Change in parental health between wave 1 and wave 2 (better-worse)[b]	0.39*	0.90*	0.29*	1.09**
Parent unpartnered between wave 1 and wave 2 (ref=continuously partnered) [b]	-0.26	2.17	1.63***	3.11**
Parent partnered between wave 1 and wave 2 (ref=continuously partnered)[b]	-0.10	-0.88	-2.13~	1.12
Parent unpartnered in wave 1 and wave 2 (ref=continuously partnered)[b]	0.05	0.62	0.52**	0.50
Parents ever divorced[b]	-0.45	0.43	0.07	-0.10
Education of parent (low-high)[b]	0.12	0.13	0.09	0.08
Age of child[a]	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.02*
Daughter[a]	0.49*	0.01	0.59***	1.49*
Child partnered[a]	-0.39	-0.45~	0.24	0.22
Education of child (low-high)[a]	0.08	0.07	-0.06	-0.06
Change in parental health * norms		0.10		0.17**
Parent unpartnered between wave 1 and 2 * norms		-0.51		-0.29
Parent partnered between wave 1 and 2 * norms				-0.74
Parent unpartnered in wave 1 and 2 * norms		-0.12		0.00
Parents ever divorced * norms		-0.16		0.04
Gender of child * norms		0.10		-0.19*
Adjusted R^2	0.297	0.301	0.312	0.324

[a] Child report, [b]Parent report

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Source: Netherlands Kinship Panel Study (NKPS) 1st (2002-2003) and 2nd wave (2006-2007).

The results of the analysis by Dykstra and Fokkema show that support to parents is guided by normative beliefs about filial responsibility. Perceived relationship quality is also a predictor for support provision, but only for help to fathers, not to mothers. The authors conclude that supporting fathers is more strongly individualised than what is the case for supporting mothers. Also, filial responsibility norms seem to have a stronger motivational component for sons than for daughters. Dykstra and Fokkema suggest that it may be that daughters take support provision more for granted and are more likely to regard support as part of regular daily life activities, whereas sons to a stronger degree provide support because they feel it is expected of them.

Filial responsibility: attitudes and support behaviour among Norwegian sons and daughters

The purpose of the study by Herlofson, Slagsvold and Lima (2009) was to explore the correlation between attitudes towards filial responsibility and actual support behaviour among adult sons and daughters in norway. The following questions were posed: 1. Are daughters' attitudes to filial responsibility more positive than sons'? 2. Do more daughters provide parental support, compared to sons? And 3. Do attitudes towards filial responsibility predict their future support behaviour? Separate analyses were performed for sons and daughters, in contrast to the Dutch study, which had separate analyses for mothers and fathers.

Norway, together with the other Nordic countries, is regarded as a vanguard with regard to changing gender roles. For the last five years, Norway, as well as Iceland, Sweden and Finland, has been on the top of the list of the Global Gender Gap Index Rankings, published by the World Economic Forum (Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi, 2010). In order to measure public opinion regarding gender and care responsibilities for parents, the Generations and Gender Survey includes the following item: "When parents are in need, daughters should take more caring responsibility than sons". Among Norwegians, 90 per cent disagreed with the statement. Also in France and Germany, considerable majorities disagreed – 79 and 67 per cent respectively. In the other countries, less than half of the respondents were in disagreement, ranging from 25 per cent in Romania and 37 per cent in

Russia to 46 per cent in Bulgaria and 49 per cent in Georgia (Slagsvold and Herlofson 2008). Earlier cross-sectional analyses of attitudes to filial responsibility in Norway have shown, contrary to studies performed in other countries (e.g. De Valk and Schans 2008, Seelbach 1977, Stein et al. 1998), that men are more supportive compared to women (Daatland and Herlofson 2003a, Slagsvold et al. 2009). The Daatland and Herlofson study, however, only included old persons (aged 75 and older), whereas the analysis by Slagsvold and colleagues included the whole adult population (parents and non-parents, adult children and individuals without parents living). In the study presented here, only adult children were included (aged 40 and older at the time of the first wave of data collection). For all the items in the filial responsibility scale, measured at the time of the first data collection, more sons than daughters agreed. For example, 61 per cent of the sons and 45 per cent of the daughters agreed that "Adult children should be willing to sacrifice some of the things they want in order to support their ageing parents".

Are men more positive in their attitudes towards filial responsibility, but when it comes to actual support provision, they leave the work to their sisters? Several previous international studies have documented women's central (and men's more peripheral) role in provision of family care (e.g. Arber and Ginn 1999, Brody 1990, Davey and Szinovacz 2008, Martin Matthews and Campbell 1995). This pattern was confirmed in the Norwegians data presented here: more daughters than sons were involved in regular support provision to parents in need of help (at the time of the second wave) – 48 and 28 per cent respectively. When support was analysed separately for mothers and fathers, significant gender differences were only found for help to mothers. Among daughters, 46 per cent reported having provided regular support to mothers in need of help, compared to 25 per cent of the sons.. For help to fathers, no gender difference was found, – 27 per cent of both daughters and sons said they had provided regular support.

What about the relationship between attitudes towards filial responsibility at wave 1 and actual provision of support at wave 2? The multivariate regression analyses showed that attitudes did predict support provision to parents five years later. The correlation was statistically significant for both sons and daughters, but stronger for the former than the latter (figure 6.1). The figure shows, however, that independently of filial responsibility score, the probability of providing support was higher for daughters than for sons. In the analysis (which the figure is built on), we controlled for children's age and level of education.

Age did not have any impact. We did not find any evidence of older children being more inclined to provide support, as Dykstra and Fokkema (2009) reported from the Dutch study. Educational level, on the other hand, mattered somewhat for daughters. The propensity to provide support was highest among daughters with a middle level of education (i.e. secondary education). For sons, educational level did not have any impact on the probability of providing regular support.

Figure 6.1 Predicted probabilities of providing regular support to parents by filial responsibility score and gender.



Source: The Norwegian Life-course, Ageing and Generation Panel Study (NorLAG), n=1,002.

As Dykstra and Fokkema (2009) did, we controlled for change in need during the 5-year period from wave 1 to wave 2. Change in parents' marital status (i.e. widowhood) did not have any effect on adult children's support behaviour. Change in need due to health limitations was, however – and not unexpectedly – strongly correlated with support. Moreover, change in parental needs was a much stronger predictor of support than attitudes towards filial responsibility. Figure 6.1 indicated that attitudes did predict support behaviour five years later. Figure 6.2 confirms this finding, but only if parental needs are stable during the period in question. For adult children who experienced parents coming in need during the five-year period, there was no correlation whatsoever between attitudes

and actual support. The propensity to provide regular support was just as high among those with a low score on the filial responsibility scale, as for those with a high score.

Figure 6.2 Predicted probabilities of providing regular support to parents by filial responsibility score and parental needs.



Source: The Norwegian Life-course, Ageing and Generation Panel Study (NorLAG), n=974.

The results of our analyses show that the correlation between attitudes towards filial responsibility and actual provision of support is substantial, and more so for sons than for daughters. That sons are more responsive to filial norms, is in line with the Dutch findings described above. When parental needs arise, however, both daughters and sons respond to the changing needs irrespective of their earlier attitudes to filial responsibility.

In the following part, we will continue to concentrate on Norwegian data and address changes in support of filial responsibility over a five-year period.

5. Changes in attitudes to filial responsibility in Norway

The present chapter examines changes in attitudes to filial responsibility over a five-year period using panel data. The exact same respondents answered the exact same questions at two points in time, in 2002-2003 and in 2007-2008. We ask: Have Norwegians become more or less inclined to accept filial responsibility during this period? If changes are observed, it may be because of age-, cohort- or period effects, or it may be because of changes in individual or family circumstances.

Age, cohort or period effects?

Age effects are the consequences of maturation or growing older (e.g. Alwin and McCammon 2004). Such effects have also been referred to as "life cycle effects" cycle (e.g. Firebaugh and Harley 1991, Hellevik 2002, Visser and Krosnick 1998). More than forty years ago, Schaie (1967) reminded us that the fact that older people have different cognitive skills compared to younger individuals does not necessarily reflect an effect of age, but of cohort, as younger cohorts have been part of the educational revolution and therefore have attained a higher level of education compared to older cohorts. In a much cited article published two years earlier, Ryder (1965) had pointed to the cohort "as a concept in the study of social change". When the effect of a given historical events affects the various age groups differently, we have a *cohort effect* (e.g. Alwin and McCammon 2004, Davis 2004, Elder 1974, Mannheim 1952, Ryder 1965). If, on the other hand, the same historical event affects the whole population more or less similarly, or as Elder (1991) puts it it: "the influence of a social change or event is relatively uniform across successive cohorts" (p. 67), we speak of *a period effect*. Alwin and McCammon (2004) use the events of September 11 as an illustration – the terrorist attacks "have had profound effects on *all* members of American society, regardless of year of birth" (p. 30).

The focus here is on support to filial responsibility over a five-year period in a panel sample. Has the acceptance of this type of responsibility remained stable during the five-year period or has it changed? If change is observed, is it because the sample has become five years older (age effect)? Are there clear differences in attitudes among individuals belonging to different birth cohorts or have certain birth cohorts changed attitudes whereas others have not

(cohort effect)? Or could it be that the whole sample has changed their attitudes to filial responsibility, not because they have grown older, but because of a period effect? Finally, it is also possible that changes have occurred because of changing individual and family circumstances among the respondents (e.g. becoming grandparent, having parents who start to need help, losing parents).

Individual or family level effects?

Individuals may not only change because they age, because they belong to a certain birth cohort or because of a period effect, it may also be that they change as a result of changing individual or family circumstances, or because of transitions in key roles and statuses. It is commonly assumed that individuals change their attitudes in response to new experiences or learning processes (e.g. Ajzen 1988, Festinger 1957). Also, according to cognitive dissonance theory, a person who initially holds negative or positive attitudes toward a certain behaviour, may change these attitudes (once he or she has had the experience) in order to reach consistency in attitudes and behaviour (Festinger 1957).

Several changes and transitions are relevant for the study of changes in attitudes toward filial responsibility. Declining health for example, may lead to a reappraisal of such attitudes. It is, however, not obvious what direction a change would take. On the one hand, parents with increasing health problems may start to feel more dependent on their children, and as a consequence become more supportive of filial responsibility. On the other hand, they may fear to become a burden on their children and therefore be less in favour of this type of responsibility.

Adult children may change their attitudes when parents become frail. Blenkner (1965) introduced the concept "filial maturity" to describe the transition of adult children when they become sources of support for parents, and Cicirelli (1988) wrote about "filial anxiety" – the time when adult children start worrying about how they will manage care duties when parents become in need of support. Gans and Silverstein (2006) suggest that support for filial responsibility should peak in midlife as a response to "filial maturity". Other changes or transitions that may change attitudes toward filial responsibility include becoming grandparents, losing parents, divorce (both own divorce and divorce among parents, adult children).

Earlier research

Two earlier studies have examined attitudes to filial responsibility norms across time. In one, data from the Southern Californian Longitudinal Study of Generations were used (Gans and Silverstein 2006). The other employed data from the Social Change Survey in Taiwan (Hsu, Lew-Ting and Wu 2001). In both, age, cohort and period effects are discussed. Gans and Silverstein (2006) analysed trends in support of filial responsibility with panel data (same respondents) from four times of measurement (1985, 1994, 1997, and 2000). Hsu and colleagues (2001) used data collected in 1984, 1990 and 1995 from representative samples of the Taiwanese population (not same respondents).

Age effects

Gans and Silverstein (2006) hypothesise that on support for filial responsibility peaks in midlife, either because of "filial maturity" or "filial anxiety". According to this line of reasoning, the sense of responsibility should change depending on life-phase , being lower among younger and older adults, compared to those in-between who are likely to have parents in need help. Previous cross-sectional research on filial responsibility has not found any evidence for this "mid-life peak" thesis. Logan and Spitze (1995) for example, in an analysis of adults aged 40 and above, found the support to decline with age.[8] De Valk and Schans (2008) on the other hand, in a study among Dutch 50-80 year olds, did not find any age effect. In the analysis of filial responsibility in chapter 3 covering all adults (from 18 to 79), a negative age effect was found for Norway (table 3.3) – older respondents were less inclined to support this type of responsibility compared to younger. A negative age effect was also found for The Netherlands (see also Liebroer and Mulder 2006). In Hungary and Romania, on the other hand, the effect of age was positive. [9] It is, however, not possible to separate age and cohort effects in cross-sectional studies. In their longitudinal Taiwanese study, Hsu et al. (2001) did not find any evidence of people in mid-life being more supportive of filial responsibility, rather the contrary. Gans and Silverstein (2006) on the other hand, who employed longitudinal panel data,

[8] Logan and Spitze use the concept "family obligations" and not "filial obligations", but all their items refer to adult children's responsibility for old parents.

[9] Many of the earlier studies include only parents above a certain age, often 65 years and older (e.g. Lee, Peek and Coward 1998, Peek et al. 1998, Silverstein and Litwak 1995, see table 4 in the appendix for more information about study design of the various studies), thus making analysis of different age groups difficult.

did find some evidence of adults becoming more supportive of filial responsibility around mid-life, and less supportive thereafter.

Cohort effects

Gans and Silverstein (2006) and Hsu et al. (2001) discuss how changes in support for filial responsibility may be a result of belonging to different birth cohorts. Hsu and colleagues (2001) describe recent changes in social policy in Taiwan and suspect that as a result, there should be considerable differences between older and younger birth cohorts in attitudes towards supporting parents. Gans and Silverstein (2006) suggest that older adults today grew up in a period when family care was stressed and may have maintained their support to family obligations (including filial responsibility) throughout life. If this is the case, aggregate changes in attitudes take place as a result of cohort replacement. This idea is central in much of the literature around social and cultural change, for example in discussions of *The Second demographic transition* where weakening family values and growing individualisation are considered to be the result of cohort succession (e.g. Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988).[10]

Danigelis, Hardy and Cutler (2007) remind us that although cohort replacement has received considerable attention as a key mechanism of change, age effects are also important. In their study of changes in socio-political attitudes over a thirty-year period, they find that "as cohorts advance through stages of their life course, they attend less to the arguments of cohorts who came before them and move more in the direction of cohorts who follow them" (p. 823). In the two studies of changes in attitudes towards filial responsibility, neither Hsu and colleagues (2001), nor Gans and Silverstein (2006) found any evidence of older cohorts being more supportive compared to younger cohorts. In the latter study, the opposite turned out to be the case. Individuals born in the 1950s and 1960s were more positive to this type of responsibility when they reached mid-life compared to those born 20-30 years earlier (Gans and Silverstein 2006). At the same time, Gans and Silverstein found a general weakening of filial responsibility over historical time and sum up as follows: "The profamilistic trend across successive generations exists simultaneously with an opposite historical trend of weakening norms" (p. 973).

[10] See also Inglehart (1986) and Abramson and Inglehart (1992) for more about the cohort replacement thesis.

Period effects

Changes in support to filial responsibility may be a consequence of a period effect. If, for example, there is a decline in welfare state services for old people (i.e. home help and care services) in a certain period, people may change their attitudes to family obligations. It is not clear, however, what direction such a change may take. People may become more supportive as they see that old persons become more in need of family care, or they may change their attitudes in a negative direction in order to demonstrate their disagreement with the downward trend in welfare state provisions. Another explanation is that a possible weakening support of filial responsibility is part of a general decline in family values, a historical trend that is affecting the whole population (e.g. Bellah et al. 1985, Popenoe 1993). Both Gans and Silverstein (2006) and Hsu et al. (2001) find evidence of a period effect – an on-going historical change towards less support to filial responsibility, across age- and cohort groups.

Individual and family circumstances

In efforts to separate age, cohort and period effects, repeated measures are needed, but they do not necessarily need to include the same respondents (panel sample). If, on the other hand, the purpose of the analysis is to study whether or not changes in individual or family circumstances have an impact on changes in attitudes, it is necessary to follow the same respondents from one measurement to the other. Earlier research has for example shown how individuals who divorce become more positive in their attitudes towards divorce (e.g. Amato and Booth 1991, Thornton 1985) and those who start to cohabit develop more positive attitudes toward cohabitation (Axinn and Thornton 1993). .

As mentioned above, several changes are relevant for the study of support to filial responsibility across time. In the study from Southern California, only parental death was considered (Gans and Silverstein 2006). The authors expected respondents who lost their parent(s) to reevaluate their attitudes toward filial responsibility. Their analysis showed that following generational succession in the family, support to filial responsibility declined significantly. Here we include the following changes: declining health, widowhood, divorce, losing parents, and becoming grandparents.

Sample and measures

For the analyses, we employ panel data from the Norwegian Life-course, Ageing and Generations Panel Study (NorLAG). The first wave was carried out in 2002-2003 and included 5,589 respondents aged 40 to 79. The second wave was more extensive, including also the 18-39 age group (total sample size = 15,156). A total of 3,796 respondents participated in both surveys. The filial responsibility scale (based on a scale developed by Lee, Peek and Coward 1998) which was included in both waves, was part of the postal questionnaire[11]. 2,593 respondents completed the postal questionnaires at both wave 1 and wave 2. At the time of the first wave of data collection, their age ranged from 40 to 79 years (mean age = 56). Consequently, five years later, they were between 45 and 84 years of age (mean age = 61).

The filial responsibility scale included the following items, with five response categories ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" (with a "neither agree nor disagree" option in the middle):

- Adult children should live close to their parents so that they can help them.
- Adult children should be willing to sacrifice some of the things they want in order to support their ageing parents.
- Older people should be able to depend on their adult children.
- Parents are entitled to some return for the sacrifices they have made for their children.

Decreasing agreement with filial responsibility

Based on the four items of filial responsibility, we constructed an additive index ranging from 4 to 16 (the higher the score, the more positive attitudes). Figure 5.1 below shows mean scores for women and men, as well as the whole sample, at both waves. In the first wave of NorLAG, the mean score on the filial responsibility index was 12.0 (SD=3.51) for the whole sample. In the second wave, five years later, it had dropped to 11.0 (SD=3.58). As shown in chapter 3 of the present report, Norwegian men express stronger support for filial responsibility compared to women (data from wave 2). This is confirmed in the longitudinal analysis. Men score higher than women at both waves but when we look at the change in mean score from the first to the second wave, we see that it is somewhat greater for men (from 12.7 to 11.6, $p < .001$) than for

[11] The second wave included to scales to measure filial responsibility. The scale used in the Generations and Gender Survey was included in the telephone interview (see chapter 3 for details), whereas the one used in NorLAG, 1st wave was part of the postal questionnaire.

women (from 11.4 to 10.6, $p < .001$). This finding is confirmed by an estimation of effect sizes (*Cohen's d*, see Cohen 1988), which is somewhat larger for men (0.31) than for women (0.24).[12]

Figure 5.1. Mean scores on the filial responsibility index by gender, wave 1 - wave 2.



Source: The Norwegian Life-course, Ageing and Generation Panel Study (NorLAG), N=2,593..

As shown in the figure, middle-aged and old Norwegian men and women became somewhat less positive in their attitudes towards filial responsibility from 2002-2003 to 2007-2008. Was this because they had become five years older? Did some birth cohorts change their attitudes more than others or did the whole sample become less inclined to support filial responsibility?

The following table and figures (table 5.2 and figures 5.2 to 5.5) illustrate how the attitudes of the various birth cohorts/age groups changed from the first wave in 2002-2003 to the second wave five years later (2007-2008). The age range for each group should equal the interval between the two studies. Therefore, we use five-year age groups in order to follow the same respondents from the first wave of data collection to the second. Table 5.1 shows the sample size for each age group (age at the time of wave 1):

[12] d=0.2 and d=0.3 are considered as small or small to medium effect sizes according to Cohen's guidelines (Cohen 1988). It is, however, important to note that although the effect size is small, it may often be of importance (LeCroy and Krysik 2007), as also Cohen points out.

Table 5.1. Sample size by birth cohort/age group (age at wave 1).

40-44 (1957-1961)	45-49 (1952-1956)	50-54 (1947-1951)	55-59 (1942-1946)	60-64 (1937-1941)	65-69 (1932-1936)	70-74 (1927-1931)	75-79 (1922-1926)	Total
n=360	n=416	n=434	n=426	n=375	n=250	n=200	n=132	N=2,593

Source: The Norwegian Life-course, Ageing and Generation Panel Study (NorLAG).

The mean score on the filial responsibility index decreased for the whole panel sample from 12.0 to 11.0 during the five year period between the two waves. Table 5.2 shows the change for each of the eight birth cohorts. The table is based on a standard cohort table (Lexis-diagram) (e.g. Glenn 1977) as it follows the various age groups/cohorts from the first to the second wave (diagonals) and at the same time makes it possible to compare (vertically) the same age groups at the two waves (e.g. respondents aged 40-44 in 2002-2003 and those in the same age range in 2007-2008):

Table 5.2 Mean scores on the filial responsibility index by birth cohort and age group, wave 1 - wave 2.

Age group	**Wave 1 (2002-2003)**	**Wave 2 (2007-2008)**	**Significant *within-cohort* change?** [a]	**Significant *cross-cohort* change?** [b]
40-44	12.6	-	-	-
45-49	12.2	11.5	***	**
50-54	11.7	11.1	***	*
55-59	11.6	10.7	***	***
60-64	11.5	10.8	***	**
65-69	11.8	10.2	***	***
70-74	12.4	11.0	***	***
75-79	13.1	11.7	**	**
80-84	-	12.8	ns	-

Source: The Norwegian Life-course, Ageing and Generation Panel Study (NorLAG).

Notes: [a] T-test paired samples, comparisons of means on filial responsibility index for the various birth cohorts, wave 1 and wave 2. [b] Independent samples T-test, comparisons of means on filial responsibility index for respondents in same age groups.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, ns = non significant.

Table 5.2 indicate that all birth cohorts scored lower on the filial responsibility index at the time of wave 2, compared to wave 1. The change was significant for all, with the exception

of the oldest cohort (individuals born 1922-1926).[13] An explanation could be that they have all become five years older – they have become more negative to filial responsibility as a consequence of growing older. But when we look at the different age groups, we note significant changes as well. The mean score of respondents in all age groups were lower at wave 2 compared to those in the same age group five years earlier. For example, respondents aged 65 to 69 at wave 1 had a mean score of 11.8. Those with the same age (65-69) five years later had a mean score of 10.2.

The trends presented above may also be illustrated by showing changes in the proportions disagreeing (disagree and strongly disagree) with the four statements (items) in the two waves (figure 5.1 to 5.4). The four figures below include two columns for each five-year birth cohort. The first column (darker colour) represents the respondents at the time of wave 1 and the second column (lighter colour) wave 2.

Figure 5.2. Attitude toward "Adult children should live close to their parents so that they can help them", % disagreeing.



Note: Significant changes for all birth cohorts, except those born 1952-56, 1932-36 and 1922-26.

[13] Estimations of the effect sizes (*Cohen's d*) for the different cohorts show a variation from 0.08 (1922-26 birth cohorts, aged 75-79 at wave 1) to 0.36 (1937-41 birth cohorts, aged 60-64 at wave 1). Effect sizes for the cohorts born before 1937 are smaller than for the later-borns (see footnote 19 above for more information about interpretation of *Cohen's d*).

Figure 5.3. Attitude toward “Adult children should be willing to sacrifice some of the things they want in order to support their ageing parents”, % disagreeing.



Note: Significant changes for all birth cohorts, except those born 1922-26.

Figure 5.4. Attitude toward “Older people should be able to depend on their adult children”, % disagreeing.



Note: Significant changes for all birth cohorts, except those born 1932-36, 1927-31 and 1922-26.

Figure 5.5. Attitude toward “Parents are entitled to some return for the sacrifices they have made for their children”, % disagreeing.



Note: Significant changes for all birth cohorts, except those born 1942-46, 1927-31 and 1922-26.

As both table 5.2 and figures 5.2 to 5.5 show, the change from the first to the second wave has been negative for all items and all groups meaning that they have reduced their support to filial responsibility during the five-year period. Only the oldest cohorts (born 1922-26) did not show a significant change, but also for this group the trend went in a negative direction (except for support to the last filial responsibility item, see figure 5.5).

We conclude that the changes in support to filial responsibility do not seem to be a consequence of ageing. Although the respondents have become five years older, we do not find the older being less supportive, or changing their attitudes more, compared to the younger. Neither do the changes seem to be due to a cohort effect. Except for the very oldest, all have become significantly more negative. There is no particular birth cohort that stand out as having changed considerably more than others. The change seems to have been quite uniform across all cohorts, which suggest that the increase in negative attitudes to filial responsibility constitutes a *period* effect.

Below we will consider individual and family circumstances to see if certain changes or transitions are likely to have produced the changes in support to filial responsibility.

Changes in individual and family circumstances and support of filial responsibility

Can selected events between the first and the second wave account for the decline in support for filial responsibility? We here examine whether changes in subjective health and marital status, losing parents, or becoming grandparents have played a role in this decline. The analyses were done using repeated measures analysis of variance, controlling for age and gender. The results er presented in figures 5.1 – 5.4. The overall finding is that none of these factors can account for the decline in agreement with filial responsibily. In figure 5.1 change in filial responsibility between the two waves for change in subjective health is shown. Three of the groups, poor health at both times, good health at wave 1 and poor at wave 2, and good health both times, all show similar declines. The graph indicates that respondents who experienced an improvement in health lowered their support more than the other groups. The overall test shows, however, that the differences are not statistically significant. Figure 5.2 illustrates changes according to marital status (new partner, stable, divorced, widowed). The differences between the groups are also here not statistically significant. We find the same for the effect of the loss of parents on changes in filial resposibility (figure 5.3). The last figure (5.4) shows changes in attitudes for those who became grandparents for the first time between the two waves (compared to those who were already grandparents at wave 1 who had not yet become grandparents at wave 2). Again, the change over time is the same for the two groups, although those who became grandparents for the first time between the two waves showed less support for filial responsibility at both times of data collection.

Figure 5.1 Changes in subjective health and changes in attitudes towards filial responsibility, mean scores wave 1 – wave 2.



Note: Repeated measures analysis of variance, controlling for age and gender.

Stable good health (n=2,351), stable poor health (n=564), improvement in health (n=294), worsening health (n=547).

Figure 5.2 Changes in marital status and changes in attitudes towards filial responsibility, mean scores wave 1 – wave 2.



Note: Repeated measures analysis of variance, controlling for age and gender.

Stable (partnered or single) (n=3,425), widowed (n=95), divorced (n=90), new partner (n=125).

Figure 5.3 Changes in family status (becoming orphan) and changes in attitudes towards filial responsibility, mean scores wave 1 – wave 2.



Note: Repeated measures analysis of variance, controlling for age and gender.

No change (n=3,304), lost parents (becoming orphans) (n=437).

Figure 5.4 Changes in family status (becoming grandparent) and changes in attitudes towards filial responsibility, mean scores wave 1 – wave 2.



Note: Repeated measures analysis of variance, controlling for age and gender.

No change (n=3,267), becoming grandparents (n=488).

Summing up

The panel analyses of change in support for filial responsibility have shown a significant decline in support for filial obligations over a five-year period for both men and women, as well as for all age groups. This decline could not be accounted for by changes in the respondents' health, marital status nor by family events such as losing parents or by becoming grandparents. This leaves a *period* effect as the most plausible explanation. Can we identify events in the Norwegian society during these five years that may contribute to explain the observed decline in support? A recurring issue in public discussions of social policy, has been population ageing. Although Norway is experiencing a considerably less dramatic ageing of the population compared to other European countries (United Nations 2009), there is a concern for the future of elder care (financial burden, problems with recruitment of care workers) and it has been suggested that the family may have to take on a greater responsibility in the future.[14] Also, there has been an increase in the Norwegian media's reports of elder care. For example, the term "elder care" was mentioned more than six times as often in the two years preceding the second wave of NorLAG than in the two years before the first wave.[15] It seems fair to say that through the media, Norwegians may have become increasingly aware of a welfare state "under threat" and the possible limits of the welfare state in the coming years. This may have changed the references (or the frame) for answering the questions about filial responsibility in the second compared to the first wave. In the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century (2000-2003), a high level of welfare state services were perhaps more taken for granted compared to some years later. Also, Norwegians have been increasingly confronted with possible future demands on families to provide care for old family members, and this is an idea many turn down. These are of course only speculations, but the changes in attitudes towards filial responsibility may reflect the fact that although a considerable share is positive to filial responsibility for their *own* parents, they discard the idea that they should *have to* provide support, or that the society should enforce adult children to provide demanding care for frail parents.

[14] See for example: "Mer eldreomsorg blir familiens ansvar" (More elder care to become the responsibility of the family), *Aftenposten*, 10.10.2009, "Stor mangel på omsorgsarbeidere" (Great lack of care workers), *NTB* , 25.12.2005.

[15] www.retriever-info.com

6. Grandparents: role expectations and role enactment[16]

Demographic changes in fertility and mortality during the last decades have given grandchildren more grandparents and grandparents fewer grandchildren. Compared to a century ago, children today have fewer siblings and cousins to compete with for the attention and resources of their grandparents, and grandparents are healthier and have more resources to spend on their grandchildren (Uhlenberg 2004, p. 77). According to Uhlenberg, the proportion of children aged ten with all four grandparents living has increased seven-fold during the 20th century in the United States. Only very few children today grow up without any of their parents' parents living. In a recent study of grandchildren aged 10-12 in Norway, 40 per cent had all four grandparents living, only one per cent had none (Hagestad 2006). Vital, active and resourceful grandparents in their third age with a limited number of grandchildren may provide essential support to families with young children. But are grandparents prepared to help out? And do we find different types of grandparenting practices in various welfare state regimes? We will discuss both role expectations and role enactment of grandparents using data from The Norwegian life-course, ageing and generations study, as well as European data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) for illustrations.[17]

Is there a grandparenthood role?

In Norway, a common assumption is that grandparents are more busy playing golf or travelling abroad than caring for their grandchildren. It has also been argued that we do not have a grandparent role. But if we look at the attitudes of Norwegian grandparents regarding what grandparents *should* do, we see that there is remarkable consensus about the role of grandparents. Almost all respondents agree (strongly agree or agree) that grandparents' duty is to be there for grandchildren in cases of difficulty (94 per cent of the

[16] The present chapter builds on and extends previous work by Gunhild Hagestad and Katharina Herlofson (Hagestad and Herlofson 2009, 2010a, 2010b).

[17] The first wave of NorLAG was carried out in 2002-2003 and includes respondents aged 40 to 79 years (N=5,589). SHARE's first wave of data collection was in 2004 and is restricted to the population aged 50 and above (N=31,115) (Börsch-Supan and Jürges 2005, Börsch-Supan et al. 2005). In the present study we only include respondents who have grandchildren.

grandfathers and 97 per cent of the grandmothers). About 9 out of 10 feel that grandparents should provide encouragement and support to their children in the parenting role, as well as do things with their grandchildren. Fewer agree that grandparents should contribute towards grandchildren's economic security (48 and 34 per cent respectively) or be a corrective in childrearing (36 and 25 per cent). Whereas gender differences are almost absent in agreement regarding availability (be there in case of a crisis or do things with grandchildren) and encouragement (support adult children in the parenting role), we see that grandfathers are more likely than grandmothers to agree that a grandparent's duty is to contribute financially or to be a corrective in childrearing (table 4.1).

Table 5.1. Attitudes towards the grandparenthood role among Norwegian grandparents (%).

% agreeing or strongly agreeing that grandparents should…:	**Grandfathers**	**Grandmothers**
be available to grandchildren in cases of difficulty (e.g. illness, divorce)	94	97
provide encouragement and support to adult children in role as parents	89	91
do things together with grandchildren	91	94
contribute towards the economic security of adult children and their families	48	34
be a corrective in the rearing of grandchildren	36	25
N	864-871	1080-1094

Source: The Norwegian panel study of life-course, ageing and generations (NorLAG), 1st wave, 2002-2003.

One thing is what grandparents feel is a duty towards grandchildren, another is what they actually do. For example, how many look after grandchildren regularly? As figure 4.1 illustrates, only very few Norwegian grandparents take care of grandchildren every day (4-5 per cent). Equally few *never* look after their grandchildren. It is much more common to do it on a weekly or monthly basis – more than half of the grandparents report taking care of grandchildren with this frequency (52 per cent of the grandfathers and 58 per cent of the grandmothers).

Figure 4.1 Grandparents looking after grandchildren by gender of grandparents (%).



Source: The Norwegian panel study of life-course, ageing and generations (NorLAG), 1st wave, 2002-2003, n=1,978.

The Norwegian grandparenthood role in a comparative perspective

Family responsibility norms are believed to have a stronger back-up in southern European countries which have a more familialistic orientation than in northern Europe. Comparative studies of filial responsibility show a clear north-south gradient with southern European being more in support of this type of family responsibility compared to northern Europeans (Daatland and Herlofson 2003c, Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008). Also, there is a north-south contrast in support for welfare state versus family responsibility with public opinion in Scandinavia being considerably more in favour of a state responsibility compared to what is the case in central and southern Europe (Daatland and Herlofson 2003b, Haberkern and Szydlik 2010).

What about attitudes towards grandparental responsibilities? Do they too indicate a north-south gradient? Below, we compare Norwegian data from the first wave of the Norwegian panel study of life course, ageing and generations with findings from SHARE (the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe). For the Norwegian data to be comparable with SHARE, we include grandparents (in various age groups) who *strongly*

agree with the following items: be available to grandchildren in cases of difficulty (figure 4.2) and contribute towards the economic security of their grandchildren (figure 4.3).

Figure 4.2 % grandparents who strongly agree that a grandparent's duty is to be there for grandchildren in cases of difficulty, by country and age of grandparent.



Sources: NorLAG, 1st wave, n=1959 (Norway) and SHARE, n=9,475 (Attias-Donfut and Ogg 2006)

Figure 4.3 % of grandparents who strongly agree that a grandparent's duty is to contribute towards the economic security of their grandchildren, by age of grandparent.*



* The item was phrased somewhat differently in NorLAG: ”Grandparents should contribute towards the economic security of adult children and their families”.

Sources: NorLAG, 1st wave, n=1959 (Norway) and SHARE, n=9,475 (Attias-Donfut and Ogg 2006).

As for contributing towards the economic security of grandchildren, more southern European grandparents strongly agree that this is a grandparental duty compared to what is the case in central and northern Europe (figure 4.3). The countries with the lowest support are Denmark and The Netherlands. The family has legal obligations towards its (adult) members in many European countries. This include an upward responsibility – towards parents (e.g. Russia) or downwards – towards adult children (e.g. The Netherlands), or both (e.g. Germany, Italy). In several countries, grandparents are also legally responsible for grandparents (Germany and southern Europe). This may be part of the reason why southern European grandparents are most inclined to *strongly agree* that it is a grandparent's duty to contribute towards the economic security of grandchildren. A considerable larger share of grandparents strongly agrees that grandparents should be there for grandchildren in cases of difficulty (figure 4.2). Also here we find southern European grandparents being inclined to agree with the item. But also many northern Europeans see this as a grandparent's responsibility. In fact, the highest share of grandparents strongly agreeing is found in Norway (around two thirds). The lowest shares are in central European countries – 35-40 per cent in Germany, Switzerland and Austria, and in The Netherlands (circa 30 per cent).

What about actual care for grandchildren? A large proportion of Norwegian grandparents report taking care of grandchildren regularly. 56 per cent of grandfathers and 63 per cent of grandmothers say they look after grandchildren at least once a month, but very few provide this type of help on a daily basis (less than 5 per cent). What does the pattern look like in other parts of Europe (figure 4.4)? Perhaps contrary to common expectations, what we see is that larger proportions of grandparents in Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands are involved in grandchild care compared to grandparents living further south. But if we only consider daily care, this picture is turned upside down (figure 4.5). Among grandparents who look after grandchildren regularly or occasionally, very few in Northern Europe do so on a daily basis. In the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy and Greece) on the other hand, around half of the grandparents who are involved in grandchild care, seem to act more or less as full-time baby-sitters.

Figure 4.4 Grandparents who look after grandchildren regularly or occasionally, by country (%).



Sources: NorLAG, 1st wave, n=1,980 (Norway) and SHARE, n=13,157 (Attias-Donfut and Ogg 2006).

Figure 4.5 Provision of daily (or almost daily) grandchild care among grandparents who look after grandchildren, by country (%).



Sources: NorLAG, 1st wave, n=1,698 (Norway) and SHARE, n=6,301 (Attias-Donfut and Ogg 2006).

Substitution or complementarity?

A larger proportion of grandparents are involved in looking after grandchildren occasionally in northern Europe, but a considerably higher share of southern European grandparents tend to be full-time carers. This pattern is remarkably similar to the one found for provision of parent care. For example, Ogg and Renault (2006) have shown that more Swedish parents (aged 75+) receive help from children (compared to parents in Italy and Spain, but far more Italian and Spanish parents reported having received *daily* help (compared to the Swedes). Brandt, Haberkern and Szydlik (2009) conclude that considerably more adult children give practical help to parents in northern compared to southern Europe, but provision of more intensive personal care is more frequent in the south.

The interplay between families and public services has commonly been discussed under the framework of substitution versus complementarity or crowding-out/crowding-in. The substitution thesis states that there is an inverse relationship between service provision and family care. When service levels are high, family care is low or absent, and vice versa (Lingsom 1997, Daatland and Herlofson 2001). This has also been referred to as a crowding-out situation (e.g. Künemund and Rein 1999, Motel-Klingebiel, Tesch-Römer, and von Kondratowitz 2005). Most research in this field tends to support the complementarity argument. Depending on the type of welfare state, different types and degrees of complementarity exist: in some countries families are supplemented by services, whereas the opposite is the case in others. The substitution-complimentarity debate has almost exclusively been concentrated around support for the old, but is equally relevant for grandchild care. Hank and Buber (2009) conclude that in countries like Sweden and Denmark, where public child care services are extensive and maternal employment rates are high, many grandparents complement services by taking care of grandchildren on an occasional basis (i.e. when needed).[18] A similar pattern has been described for Britain (Wheelock and Jones 2002). In southern Europe, mothers tend to be full-time carers which limits the demand for grandparental help, but if they are employed, they often have to rely on regular support from own parents or parents-in-law. Being involved in (almost) daily care for grandchildren is about ten times as common among southern European compared to northern European grandparents (figure 4.5). Also, Spanish grandmothers contribute

[18] For a detailed overview of childcare needs and childcare policies, see Saraceno (forthcoming).

significantly to the rapidly increasing female labour participation in Spain by being substitute mothers for their grandchildren while their daughters are at work (Tobío 2007).

Summing up

A substantial amount of the American research literature on grandparenthood describes grandparents as custodial parents for grandchildren (e.g. Cox 2000, Goodman and Silverstein 2002, Goodman 2007, Hayslip and Goldborg-Glen 2000, Jendrek 1994, Minkler and Roe 1993). The number of children in the United States living in grandparent-headed households without the parent generation present, increased significantly during the 1990s. In 2002, around 1.3 million children lived in these so-called "skipped generation" households (Fields 2003). The reasons for grandparents taking over primary care for grandchildren in the U.S. are manifold: drug or alcohol abuse, emotional or mental problems, physical illness, incarceration, financial needs in the middle generation (Goodman 2007). In well-functioning two-parent families on the other hand, grandparents have been described as "redundant" (Elder and Conger 2000).

Descriptions of grandparents as child-savers or as "redundant" are not found in European research. What we primarily see in this literature is a discussion of grandparents' important contribution as providers of informal childcare on an occasional or a more regular basis (e.g. Hagestad and Herlofson 2009, Hank and Buber 2009, Koslowski 2009, Leira, Tobío and Trifiletti 2005, Lewis, Campbell and Huerta 2008, Tobío 2007, Wheelock and Jones 2002). Two main pictures emerge: In northern Europe and France, where public childcare services are quite generous and affordable, many grandparents are available as supports when needed. Further south, where services are scarce, fewer grandparents are involved, but those who are often act as full-time providers. Hagestad (2006) has discussed the back-up functions of grandparents in Norway, how they step in as babysitters for grandchildren when needed, and how important it is for parents of young children to have parents as a safety net. These grandparents can be described as *family-savers* – they are available for their children and grandchildren if and when needed (e.g. times of financial hardship, marital problems, sick sickness, work travels, etc). Referring to France, another country with generous state-supported childcare, Attias-Donfut and Segalen (1998) show how important grandparents' back-up help is and how this type of support has increased since the 1970s.

Grandparents in Mediterranean Europe, on the other hand, are better described as “mother-savers”. They help out on a regular, often daily, basis, in order to allow their daughters to remain in the labour marked after having children. Italian mothers’ labour market participation increases substantially when they have parents or parents-in-law who help with childcare (Arpino, Pronzato and Tavares 2010). According to Leira, Tobío and Trifiletti (2005), Spanish and Italian grandmothers often feel responsible for taking care of grandchildren so that their daughters can be economically active. Tobío (2007) notes a certain paradox – Spanish grandmothers must assume the traditional female role in order for their daughters to be able to be modern women.

Recent data illustrate the interplay of public and private care, both in the case of children and frail old people. Thus, arguments set forth in discussions of “substitution vs. complementarity” in eldercare are also applicable in considerations of young children and their families. Furthermore, current research clearly illustrates the need to view grandparents within a three-generational perspective. A major aspect of grandparenthood in late modern, ageing societies is a continuation of parenting through support to adult children in their parenting role (Hagestad 2006). In more developed “care regimes”, grandparents may feel increased motivation to serve as a “family saver” for offspring with young children, since such readiness is less “risky” than what is the case in societies with more limited care regimes.

7. Conclusion

In this deliverable we have summarised a number of analyses which have been carried out within the framework of work package 4. In the concluding part we will highlight some of the findings.

In chapter 2 we described the great variation between countries in public opinion regarding the balance of responsibility between the family and the society for care and support of the young and the old. Norwegians are mainly in favour of a societal responsibility, Georgians and Romanians and to a certain degree also the French are more supportive of a mainly family responsibility, whereas Russians and Bulgarians feel that the responsibility should be more equally shared by the two parties. The observed variations seem to respond to different opportunity structures as well as to differences in family cultures. A somewhat surprising finding is that in France, which has a welfare state characterised by de-familialisation (in particular for child care), public opinion is more in line with the Eastern European countries than with the two western countries.

Chapter 3 examined how people regard responsibilities up and down the generational line. Two different patterns were found: one for the eastern and one for the western part of Europe. In the east, attitudes to family responsibility are highly positive, and there is little variability. In the west, the attitudes are less positive, and the variability greater. On this background, we suggest that family responsibility, as measured in GGS, should be as regarded as measuring rather firm norms in eastern Europe. In the four western countries there is less consensus, and family responsibility seem to reflect personal attitudes more than well established norms. As for filial responsibility, in all four western European countries, women were found to be less supportive than men, the employed less supportive than the non-employed, and parents less supportive than non-parents. In Norway and the Netherlands young have more positive attitudes than the old. Having divorced and having parents who divorced were found to have a negative effect or no effect on family responsibilities. The only exception here was the Netherlands, where having divorced parents was positively correlated with support to parental responsibility. In the eastern European countries family responsibility, and in particular filial responsibility, is considered almost equally important across age-groups, gender, and family and work situation.

For longitudinal analysis of the correlation between attitudes to filial responsibility and actual support provision, Dutch and Norwegian data were available. The results are presented in chapter 4. Although both countries have extensive public support systems for the elderly, one third of Norwegian adult children provide regular help to parents in need, and one half of Dutch adult children provide help with household chores to parents, irrespective of need. More daughters than sons provide support. In both countries, attitudes to filial responsibility in the first wave predict support provision reported in the second wave (three years later in the Netherlands and five years later in Norway). The relationship between attitudes and support is stronger for sons than for daughters in both countries meaning that daughters to a larger extent than sons help parents when they are in need, irrespective of earlier attitudes.

In chapter 5, we present results from an analysis of panel data regarding changes in support to filial responsibility over a five-year period in Norway. Findings show a a significant decline in support for both men and women, as well as for all age groups (40+). The decline could not be accounted for by changes in the respondents' health, marital status nor by family events such as losing parents or by becoming grandparents. The chapter ends with a discussion of reasons for this decline. One suggestion is that through the media, Norwegians have been increasingly confronted with possible future demands on families to provide care for old family members. They are not necessarily negative to filial responsibility for their own parents, but they turn down the idea that they should *have to* provide support, or that the society in the future should enforce adult children to provide demanding care for frail parents.

The last chapter (chapter 6) is an examination of the grandparent role across Europe. In contrast to findings regarding support for filial and parental responsibilities, Scandinavian grandparents are as positive to grandparents's responsibilities for grandchildren in cases of difficulties as are grandparents in Southern Europe. When it comes to enactment of the role, more grandparents in the north are involved in child care than what is the case in the south. But when frequent, daily care is considered, the opposite is the case. It is suggested that arguments set forth in discussions of "substitution vs. complementarity" in eldercare also are applicable in considerations of young children and their families. In southern Europe, a considerable share of grandparents seems to serve as mother-savers as their help is often crucial in enabling mothers of young children to be active in the work force because of lack of formal childcare

services. In northern Europe on the other hand, as well as in France, where welfare policies help reduce work-family conflict, grandparents often serve a 'reserve army' function by being available at times when extra help and support are needed.

Although there are clear cross-country differences in filial and parental responsibilities, the findings reported here should not be interpreted as representing a north-south and west-east gradient in family strength or family cohesion in general. A better interpretation is that alternative or complementary services in the more generous welfare states in western Europe have made the family less duty-driven, and other values have become more important, such as intergenerational "intimacy at a distance" (Rosenmayr and Köckeis 1963), autonomy and independence (Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008). When families become less duty-driven, support for family responsibility (attitudes, preferences) may also decrease. But it does not mean that family solidarity is "lost" (Daatland and Herlofson 2003c). What we see, for example, is that Norwegians, who are the most likely to disagree with statements about family responsibility (both filial and parental), turn out to be the most likely to provide and receive intergenerational help and assistance. Also, when parental needs arise, adult children in Norway tend to respond to these needs whatever their attitudes to filial responsibilities were five years earlier. A similar observation has been made by van Bavel and colleagues (2010) based on Dutch data. Although the Dutch do not strongly support family responsibility, they do step in and help when it is needed. When public services to both the young and the old are available, it is easier for adult children, parents and grandparents to help out as their help does not substitutes for, but complements services. They do not have to rearrange their family and work life completely in order to help, and thus care provision may seem less "risky" than what is the case in societies with more limited care regimes.

8. References

Abramson, P.R. and Inglehart, R. (1992). Generational replacement and value change in eight west European societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 22, 183-228.

Ajzen, I. (1988). *Attitudes, personality, and behavior*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.

Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M. (2005). The influence of attitudes on behavior. In: Albarracín, D., Johnson, B.T., and Zanna, M.P. (Eds.) *The handbook of attitudes*, 173-222. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Ass.

Albertini, M., Kohli, M. and Vogel, C. (2007). Intergenerational transfers of time and money in European families: common patterns – different regimes? *Journal of European Social Policy*, 17, 319-334.

Alwin, D.F. and McCammon, R.J. (2004). Generations, cohorts, and social change. In: Mortimer, J.T. and Shanahan, M.J. (Eds.) *Handbook of the life course*, 23-49. New York: Springer.

Amato, P.R. and Booth, A. (1991). The consequences of divorce for attitudes towards divorce and gender roles. *Journal of Family Issues*, 12, 306-322.

Arber, S. and Ginn, J. (1999). Gender differences in informal caring. In Allan, G. (Ed.) *The sociology of the family. A reader*, 321-339. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Arpino, B., Pronzato, C. and Tavares, L. (2010). All in the family: Informal childcare and mothers' labour market participation. *ISER Working Paper Series*, No. 2010-24.

Attias-Donfut, C. and Ogg, J. (2006). Grandmothers, employment, and looking after grandchildren. Paper presented at the International Federation on Ageing 8th Global Conference, Copenhagen, 30 May-2 June.

Attias-Donfut, C. and Segalen, M. (1998). *Grand-parents. La famille à travers les Générations*. Paris : Odile Jacobs.

Axinn, W.G. and Thornton, A. (1993). Mothers, children, and cohabitation: The intergenerational effects of attitudes and behavior. *American Sociological Review*, 58, 233-246.

Banaji, M.R. and Heiphetz, L. (2010). Attitudes. In: Fiske, S.T., Gilbert, D.T., and Lindzey, G. (Eds.) *Handbook of social psychology.* Vol. 1, 353-393. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

Bengtson, V.L. and Roberts, R.E.L. (1991). Intergenerational solidarity in aging families: an example of formal theory construction. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 53, 4, 856–870.

Blenkner, M. (1965). Social work and family relationship in late life. In: Shanas, E. and Streib, G. (Eds.) *Social structure and the family*, 46-61. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Blome, A., Keck, W. and Alber, J. (2009). *Family and the welfare state in Europe. Intergenerational relations in ageing societies*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Börsch-Supan, A. and Jürges, H. (Eds.). (2005). *The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe – methodology*. Mannheim: Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA).

Börsch-Supan, A., Brugiavini, A. Jürges, H. Mackenbach, J. Siegrist, J. and Weber, G.. (2005). *Health, ageing and retirement in Europe – First results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and*

Retirement in Europe. Mannheim: Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA).

Brandt, M., Haberkern, K., and Szydlik, M. (2009). Intergenerational help and care in Europe. *European Sociological Review*, 25(5), 585-601.

Brody, E. M. (1990). *Women in the middle. Their parent-care years*. New York: Springer.

Burr, J.A. and Mutchler, J.E. (1999). Race and ethnic variations in norms of filial responsibility among older persons. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 61, 674-687.

Cicirelli, V.G. (1988). A measure of filial anxiety regarding anticipated care of elderly parents. *The Gerontologist*, 23, 478-482.

Cohen, J. (1988). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Second edition*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Cooney, T.M. and Dykstra, P.A. (2011). Family obligations and support behaviour: a United States – Netherlands comparison. *Ageing and Society*, Firstview, doi:10.1017/S0144686X10001339.

Cox, C.B. (2000). *To grandmother's house we go and stay: Perspectives on custodial grandparents*. New York: Springer.

Daatland, S.O. 1990. What are families for? On family solidarity and preferences for help. *Ageing and Society*, 10(1), 1-15.

Daatland, S.O. and Herlofson, K. (2001). Service systems and family care – substitution or complementarity? In Daatland, S.O. and Herlofson, K. (Eds.) *Ageing, intergenerational relations, care systems and quality of life – an introduction to the OASIS project*, 53-61. Report 14/01. Oslo: NOVA.

Daatland, S.O. and Herlofson, K. (2003a). Norms and ideals about elder care. In Lowenstein, A. and Ogg, J. (Eds.) *OASIS. Old age and autonomy: The role of service systems and intergenerational family solidarity. Final Report*, p. 125-163. Haifa: University of Haifa.

Daatland, S.O. and Herlofson, K. (2003b). Families and welfare state: substitution or complementarity. In Lowenstein, A. and Ogg, J. (Eds.) *OASIS. Old age and autonomy: The role of service systems and intergenerational family solidarity. Final Report*, 281-305. Haifa: University of Haifa.

Daatland, S.O. and Herlofson, K. (2003c). "Lost solidarity" or "changed solidarity": a comparative European view of normative family solidarity. *Ageing & Society*, 23, 537-560.

Daatland, S.O. and Herlofson, K. (2004). *Familie, velferdsstat og aldring. Familiesolidaritet I et europeisk perspektiv* (Family, welfare state and ageing. Family solidarity in a European perspective). Report 7/04. Oslo: NOVA.

Daatland, S.O., Herlofson, K. and Lima, I.A. (2011). Balancing generations: on the strength and character of family norms in the west and east of Europe. *Ageing & Society*, Firstview. doi:10.1017/S0144686X10001315.

Daatland, S.O., Kjelvik, J., Otnes, B. and Veenstra, M. (2010). Reforming long-term care: Norway in a European comparative perspective. Paper presented at the International Conference on Evidence-based Policy in Long-term Care. London, 8 – 11 September.

Daatland, S.O., Slagsvold, B., and Lima, I.A. (2009). Population ageing, intergenerational solidarity and the family-welfare state balance: a comparative exploration. In *How generations and gender shape demographic chang change. Towards policies based on better knowledge.* United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, ECE/HBP/154, p. 127-138. New York and Geneva: United Nations.

Daatland, S.O., Veenstra, M., and Lima, I.A. (2009). *Helse, familie og omsorg over livsløpet* (Health, family and care across the life course). Report 4/09. Oslo: NOVA.

Davey, A., and Szinovacz, M. E. (2008). Division of care among adult children. In M. E. Szinovacs and A. Davey (Eds.), *Caregiving contexts. Cultural, familial and societal implications*, 133-160. New York: Springer.

Davis, J.A. (2004). Did growing up in the 1960s leave a permanent mark on attitudes and values? Evidence from the General Social Survey. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 68, 161-183.

De Valk, H.A.G. and Schans, D. (2008). "They ought to do this for their parents": perceptions of filial obligations among immigrant and Dutch older people. *Ageing & Society*, 28, 49-66.

De Vos, S. and Sandefur, G. (2002). Elderly living arrangements in Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, and Bulgaria. *European Journal of Population*, 18, 21-38.

De Vries, J., Kalmijn, M. and Liefbroer, A.C. 2009. Intergenerational transmission of kinship norms? Evidence from siblings in a multi-actor survey. *Social Science Research*, 38, 188-200.

Dinkel, R.M. (1944). Attitudes of children toward supporting aged parents. *American Sociological Review*, 9, 370-379.

Dykstra, P.A. and Fokkema, T. (2009). Normative beliefs and responsiveness to increasing parental needs. Paper presented at the XIXth IAGG World Congress, Paris, 5 – 9 July.

Dykstra, P.A. and Fokkema, T. (2011). Relationships between parents and their adult children: a West European typology of late-life families. *Ageing and Society*, Firstview, DOI:10.1017/S0144686X10001108.

Eggebeen, D.J. and Davey, A. (1998). Do safety nets work? The role of anticipated help in times of need. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 60(4), 939-950.

Elder, G.H. Jr. (1974). *Children of the Great Depression: Social change in life experience*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Elder, G.H. Jr. (1991). Lives and social change. In: W.R. Heinz (Ed.) *Theoretical advances in life course research*, Vol. I, 58-86. Weinheim, Germany: Deutscher Studien Verlag.

Elder, G.H. Jr. and Conger, R.D. (2000). *Children of the land: Adversity and success in rural America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Esping-Andersen, G. 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Evanston, Ill.: Row-Peterson.

Fields, J. (2003). *Children's Living Arrangements and Characteristics: March 2002*. Current Population Reports P20-547. Washington DC: Bureau of the Census.

Finch, J. (1989). *Family obligations and social change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Finch, J. and Mason, J. (1990). Filial obligations and kin support for elderly people. *Ageing & Society*, 10, 151-175.

Finch, J. and Mason, J. 1993. *Negotiating Family Responsibilities*. London: Tavistock/Routledge.

Finley, N.J., Roberts, M.D., and Banahan, B.F. (1988). Motivators and inhibitors of attitudes of filial obligation toward aging parents. *The Gerontologist*, 28(1), 73-78.

Firebaugh, G. and Harley, B. (1991). Trends in U.S. church attendance: Secularization and revival, or merely lifecycle effects? *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 30, 487-500.

Ganong, L.H. and Coleman, M. (1999). *Changing families, changing responsibilities. Family obligations following divorce and remarriage.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum ass.

Gans, D. and Silverstein, M. (2006). Norms of filial responsibility for aging parents across time and generations. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 68, 961-976.

Glasman, L.R. and Albarracín, D. (2006). Forming attitudes that predict future behaviour: a meta-analysis fo the attitude-behavior relation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 132(5), 778-822.

Glenn, N.D. (1977). *Cohort analysis*. Quantitative applications in the social sciences No. 5, Beverly Hills: Sage.

Goodman, C.C. (2007). Intergenerational triads in skipped-generation grandfamilies. *International journal of aging and human development*, 65(3), 231-258.

Goodman, C.C. and Silverstein, M. (2002). Grandmothers raising grandchildren: Family structure and well-being in culturally diverse families. *The Gerontologist*, 42(5), 676-689.

Haberkern, K. and Szydlik, M. (2010). State care provision, societal opinion and children's care of older parents in 11 European countries. *Ageing & Societies*, 30, 299-323.

Hagestad, G.O. 2006. Transfers between grandparents and grandchildren: The importance of taking a three-generation perspective. *Zeitschrift für Familienforschung*, 18/6, 315-332.

Hagestad, G.O. and Herlofson, K. (2007). Micro and macro perspectives on intergenerational relations and transfers in Europe. In Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Organization (UNO), *Report from United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Social and Economic Implications of Changing Population Age Structures*, 339-357. New York: UNO.

Hagestad, G.O. and Herlofson, K. (2009). Moderne besteforeldre: Velferdsstatens heimevern (Grandparents today: the welfare state's national guard). *Aldring og livsløp*, 3-4, 44-47.

Hagestad, G.O. and Herlofson, K. (2010). Grandparents in a Nordic welfare state: Role expectations and role enactment. Paper presented at the 20th Nordic Congress in Gerontology, Reykjavik, 30 May – 2 June.

Hajnal, J. (1965). European marriage patterns in perspective. In Glass, D.V. and Eversley, D.E.C. (eds), *Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography*, 101-143. London: Edward Arnold.

Hank, K. (2007). Proximity and contacts between older parents and their children: a European comparison. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 69, 1, 157-173.

Hank, K. and Buber, I. (2009). Grandparents caring for their grandchildren. Findings from the 2004 Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe. *Journal of Family Issues*, 30, 53-73.

Hanson, S.L., Sauer, W.J., and Seelbach, W.C. (1983). Racial and cohort variations in filial responsibility norms. *The Gerontologist*, 23(6), 626-631.

Hausmann, R., Tyson, L.D., and Zahini, S. (2010). *Global gender gap report*. Geneva: World Economic Forum.

Hayslip, B. Jr. and Goldberg, R. (2000). *Grandparents raising grandchildren: Theoretical, empirical, and clinical perspectives.* New York: Springer.

Hellevik, O. (2002). Age Differences in Value Orientation—Life Cycle or Cohort Effects? *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 14(3), 286-302.

Herlofson, K. & Hagestad, G.O. (2011). Transformations in the Role of Grandparents across Welfare States. To be published in Arber, S. and Timonen, V. (eds.) *Contemporary Grandparenting: Changing Family Relationships in a Global Contex*. The Polity Press

Herlofson, K., Slagsvold, B. and Lima, I.A. (2009). Ansvar for gamle foreldre – fra holdninger til handlinger (Filial responsibility – from attitudes to actual support). *Aldring og livsløp*, 3-4, 36-43.

Höllinger, F. and Haller, M. (1990). Kinship and social networks in modern societies: a cross-cultural comparison among seven nations. *European Sociological Review*, 6, 103-124.

Huber, M., Rodrigues, R., Hoffman, F., Gasior, K., and Marin, B. (2009). *Facts and figures on long-term care. Europe and North America*. Vienna: European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research.

Inglehart, R. (1986). Intergenerational changes in politics and culture: The shift from materialist to postmaterialist value priorities. *Research in Political Sociology*, 2, 81-105.

International Monetary Fund (2005). *Georgia: Poverty reduction strategy paper progress report.* IMF Country Report No. 05/113. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

International Monetary Fund (2010), *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2010 Edition. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx [Accessed October 6th 2010].

Jendrek, M.P. (1994). Grandparents who parent their grandchildren: Circumstances and decisions. *The Gerontologist*, 34, 206-216.

Jönsson, I., Daune-Richard, A.-M., Odena, S., and Ring, M. (2011). The implementation of elder-care in France and Sweden: a macro and micro perspective. *Ageing and Society*, Firstview, doi:10.1017/S0144686X10001327.

Kalmijn, M. and Kraaykamp, G. (2007). Social stratification and attitudes: a comparative analysis of the effects of class and education in Europe. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 58(4), 547-576.

Kalmijn, M. and Saraceno, C. (2008). A comparative perspective on intergenerational support. Responsiveness to parental needs in individualistic and familialistic countries. *European Societies*, 10(3), 479-508.

Keck, W., Hessel, P. and Saraceno, C. (2009). *Database on Intergenerational Policy Indicators: Methodological Report.* Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Berlin. Available online at http://www.multilinks-project.eu [Accessed 13 January 2010].

Klein Ikkink, K., van Tilburg, T., and Knipscheer, K.C.P.M. (1999). Perceived instrumental support exchanges between elderly parents and their adult children: normative and structural explanations. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 61, 831-844.

Kohli, M. and Albertini, M. (2008). The family as a source of support for adult children's own family projects: European varieties. In Saraceno, C. (ed.), *Families, Ageing and Social Policy: Intergenerational Solidarity in European Welfare States*, 38-58. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Korpi, W. (2000). Faces of inequality: gender, class and patterns of inequality in different types of welfare states. *Social Politics*, 7, 127-191.

Koslowski, A.S. (2009). Grandparents and the care for their grandchildren. In Stillwell, J. (Ed.) *Fertility, living arrangements, care and mobility*, 171-190. London: Springer.

Kraus, S.J. (1995). Attitudes and prediction of behaviour: a meta-analysis of the empirical literature. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21, 58-75.

Künemund, H. and Rein, M. (1999). There is more to receiving than needing: theoretical arguments and empirical explorations of crowding in and crowding out. *Ageing & Society*, 19, 93-121.

Lappegård, T. and Veenstra, M. (2010). *Life-course, generation and gender. Field report of the Norwegian Generations and Gender Survey*. Notater 34/2010. Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå.

Laslett, P. (1983). The significance of the past in the study of ageing. *Ageing & Society*, 4, 379-389.

LeCroy, C.W. and Krysik, J. (2007). Understanding and interpreting effect size measures. *Social Work Research*, 31, 243–248.

Lee, G.R., Netzer, J.K., and Coward, R.T. (1994). Filial responsibility expectations and patterns of intergenerational assistance. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 56, 559-565.

Lee, G.R., Peek, C.W., and Coward, R.T. (1998). Race differences in filial responsibility expectations among older parents. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 60, 404-412.

Leira, A., Tobío, C. and Trifiletti, R. (2005). Kinship and informal support: care resources for the first generation of working mothers in Norway, Italy and Spain. In: Gerhard, U., Knijn, T. and Weckwert, A. (Eds.) *Working mothers in Europe. A comparison of policies and practices*, 74-96. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Leitner, S. (2003). Varieties of Familialism. The Caring Function of the Family in Comparative Perspective. *European Societies, 5***,** 353-375.

Lesthaeghe, R. and Meekers, D. (1986). Value changes and the dimensions of familism in the European community. *European Journal of Population*, 2, 225-268.

Lesthaeghe, R. and Surkyn, J. (1988). Cultural dynamics and economic theories of fertility change. *Population and Development Review*, 14, 1-45.

Lewis, J, Campbell, M. and Huerta, C. (2008). Patterns of paid and unpaid work in Western Europe: gender, commodification, preferences and the implications for policy. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 18(1), 21-37.

Liefbroer, A.C. and Mulder, C.H. (2006). Family obligations. In: Dykstra, P.A., Kalmijn, M., Knijn, T.C.M., Komter, A.E., Liefbroer, A.C., and Mulder, C.H. (Eds.) *Family solidarity in the Netherlands*, 123-145. Population Studies. Amsterdam: Dutch University Press.

Lingsom, S. (1997). *The substitution issue. Care policies and their consequences for family care.* Report 6/97. Oslo: NOVA.

Logan, J.R. and Spitze, G.D. (1995). Self-interest and altruism in intergenerational relations, *Demography*, 32(3), 353-364.

Mannheim, K. (1952). The problem of generations. In: P. Kecskemeti (ed.) *Essays in the sociology of knowledge*, 276-322, Boston: Routledge & Keagan Paul.

Marshall, V.W., Rosenthal, C.J., and Daciuk, J. (1987). Older parents' expectations for filial support. *Social Justice Research*, 1(4), 405-423.

Martin-Matthews, A., and Campbell, L. D. (1995). Gender roles, employment and informal care. In Arber, S. and Ginn, J. (Eds.), *Connecting gender and ageing. A sociological approach*, 129-143. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.

Minkler, M. and Roe, K.M. (1993). *Grandmothers as caregivers: Raising children of the crack cocaine epidemic*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Molnar, M. (2010). Development and poverty in Romania. *Revista Megabyte*, vol. 9, 97-103.

Molnar, M., Panduru, F., Vasile, A., and Duma, V. (2006). Multidimensional Fuzzy Set Approach Poverty Estimates in Romania. *Economic Studies in Inequality, Social Exclusion and Well-Being*, vol. 3, 175-194.

Motel-Klingebiel, A., Tesch-Römer, C, and von Kondratowitz, H.-J. (2005). Welfare states do not crowd out the family: evidence for mixed responsibility from comparative analyses. *Ageing & Society*, 25, 863-882.

NorLAG (2010). *The Research Instruments in NorLAG. NorLAG1 and LOGG/NorLAG2*. Oslo: NOVA.

Ogg, J. and Renaut, S. (2006). The support of parents in old age by those born during 1945-1954: a European perspective. *Ageing & Society*, 26, 723-743.

Peek, M.K., Coward, R.T., Peek, C.W., and Lee, G.R. (1998). Are expectations for care related to the receipt of care? An analysis of parent care among disabled elders. *Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences*, 53B(3), S127-S136.

Popenoe, D. (1993). American family decline 1960-1990: A review and appraisal. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 55, 527-555.

Rauch, D. (2007). Is there really a Scandinavian social service modell? A comparison of childcare and elderlycare in six European countries. *Acta Sociologica*, 50, 249-269.

Reher, D. (1998). Family ties in western Europe: persistent contrasts. *Population and Development Review*, 24(2), 203-234.

Robila, M. (2004). Families in eastern Europe: context, trends and variations. *Contemporary perspectives in family research*, vol. 5, 1-14.

Rosenmayr, L. and Köckeis E. (1963). Propositions for a sociological theory of aging and the family. *International Social Science Journal*, 15, 410-426.

Rossi, A.S. and Rossi, P.H. 1990. *Of Human Bonding: Parent-child Relations across the Life Course.* New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Rostgaard, T. (2004). *Family Support Policy in Central and Eastern Europe - A Decade and a Half of Transition.* Synthesis Report. Paris: The Council of Europe and UNESCO.

Ruckdeschel, K., Ette, A., Hullen, G., and Leven, I. (2006). *Generations and Gender Survey. Dokumentation der ersten Welle der Hauptbefragung in Deutschland.* Materialien zur Bevölkerungswissenschaft, Number 121a. Wiesbaden: Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung.

Ryder, N.B. (1965). The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. *American Sociological Review*, 30, 843-861.

Saraceno, C. (2010). Social inequalities in facing old-age dependency: a bi-generational perspective. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 20(1), 32-44.

Saraceno, C. (2011). Childcare needs and childcare policies: A multidimensional issue. To be published in *Current Sociology*, 59(1), 78-96.

Saraceno, C. and Keck, W. (2010). Can we identify intergenerational policy regimes in Europe? *European Societies*, 12(5), 675-696.

Sauer, W., Seelbach, W., and Hanson, S. (1981). Rural-urban and cohort differences in filial responsibility norms. *Journal of Minority Aging*, 5(4), 299-305.

Saxonberg, S. and Sirovatka, T. (2006). Failing family policies in Eastern Europe. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 8(2), 185-202.

Schaie, K.W. (1967). Age changes and age differences. *The Gerontologist*, 7, 128-132.

Scharf, T. (2010). Social policies for ageing societies: perspectives from Europe. In: Dannefer, D. and Phillipson, C. (eds.) *The SAGE handbook of social gerontology*, 497-512. London: Sage.

Seelbach, W.C. (1977). Gender differences in expectations for filial responsibility. *The Gerontologist*, 17(5), 421-425.

Silverstein, M., Gans, D., and Yang, F.M. (2006). Intergenerational support to aging parents: The role of norms and needs. *Journal of Family Issues*, 27(8), 1068-1084.

Silverstein, M. and Litwak, E. (1993). A task-specific typology of intergenerational family structure in later life. *The Gerontologist*, 33(2), 258-264.

Silverstein, M., Parrott, T.M., and Bengtson, V.L. (1995). Factors that predispose middle-aged sons and daughters to provide social support to older parents. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 57, 465-475.

Slagsvold, B. and Daatland, S.O. (2008). Demographic factors and attitudes to filial responsibility - a comparative exploration. Paper presented at the *UNECE conference How generations and gender shape demographic change*, Geneve, 13 – 16 May.

Slagsvold, B., Daatland, S.O., Brunborg, H., and Lima, I.A. (2009). Holdninger til ansvar for gamle foreldre i syv europeiske land. Er vi villig til å ta oss av gamle mor og far? (Attitudes towards filial responsibility in seven European countries. Are we willing to care for our old mother and father?) *Samfunnsspeilet* 1/2009, 99-104.

Slagsvold, B. and Herlofson, K. (2008). Gender differences in family obligation norms. Paper presented at the Multilinks project progress meeting, Berlin, 30 – 31 October.

Stein, C.H., Wemmerus, V.A., Ward, M., Gaines, M.E., Freeberg, A.L., and Jewell, T.C. (1998). ”Because they’re my parents”: An intergenerational study of felt obligations and parental caregiving. . *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 60, 611-622.

Stuifbergen, M.C., van Delden, J.J.M., and Dykstra, P.A. (2008). The implications of today’s family structures for support giving to older parents. *Ageing and Society*, 28, 413-434.

Sundström, G., Malmberg, B., and Johansson, L. (2006). Balancing family and state care: neither, either or both? The case of Sweden. *Ageing and Society*, 26, 767-782.

Szebehely, M. (2005) (Ed.). *Äldreomsorgsforskning I Norden. En kunskapsöversikt*. TemaNord 2005:508. Copenhagen: Nordiska Ministerrådet.

Szelewa, D. and Polakowski, M.P. (2008). Who cares? Changing patterns of childcare in Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 18(2), 115-131.

Szydlik, M. 1996. Parent-child relations in East and West Germany shortly after the fall of the wall. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy,* 16, 12, 63-88.

Thornton, A. (1985). Changing attitudes toward separation and divorce: Causes and consequences. *American Journal of Sociology*, 90, 856-872.

Tobío, C. (2007). Change and reciprocity in intergenerational relationships: The discourse of Spanish working mothers. In: Véron, J., Pennec, S., and Légaré, J. (Eds.) *Ages, generations and the social contract: The demographic challenges facing the welfare state*, 191-207. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.

United Nations (2004). *Economic survey of Europe. No. 1.* New York and Geneva: United Nations.

United Nations (2009). *World population prospects: The 2008 Revision.* New York: United Nations.

United Nations Population Division (2009). *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*. Available at http://esa.un.org/UNPP [Accessed October 6th 2010].

Van Bavel, J., Dykstra, P.A., Wijkmans, B. and Liefbroer, A.C. (2010). *Demographic change and family obligations*. Multilinks deliverable 4.2. http://www.multilinks-project.eu/info/papers

Visser, P.S. and Krosnick, J.A. (1998). Development of attitude strength over the life cycle: surge and decline. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75(6), 1389-1410.

Wake, S.B. and Sporakowski, M.J. (1972). An intergenerational comparison of attitudes towards supporting aged parents. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 34, 42-48.

Wheelock, J. and Jones, K. (2002). ‘Grandparents are the next best thing’: Informal childcare for working parents in urban Britain. *Journal of Social Policy*, 31, 441-463.

Wicker, A.W. (1969). Attitudes versus actions: the relationship of verbal and overt behavioral responses to attitude objects. *Journal of Social Issues*, 25, 41-78.

Wijckmans, B. and Van Bavel, J. (2010). Divorce and intergenerational family obligations. Past research and current patterns in the Netherlands. *Interface Demography Working Paper* 2010 – 1.

Wolfe, A. (1989). *Whose keeper? Social science and moral obligations*. Berkely: University of California Press.

Wolfson, C., Handfield-Jones, R., Glass, K.C., McClaran, J., and Keyserlingk, E. (1993). Adult children's perceptions of their responsibility to provide care for dependent elderly parents. *The Gerontologist*, 33, 315-323.

World Health Organization (2008). *Health systems statistics*. Available at http://apps.who.int/whosis/database/core/core_select.cfm [Accessed October 6th 2010].

Appendix

Chapter 3.

Table 1a. Filial responsibility. Agreement with "Children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when the parents are in need", by country (%).

	NOR	NLD	DEU	FRA	HUN	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Strongly agree	19.0	10.7	19.4	31.8	50.8	27.8	28.4	39.4	44.4
Agree	33.4	30.3	59.1	35.6	21.6	60.7	61.6	56.3	54.3
Neither - nor	20.8	37.8	14.6	15.2	21.3	9.9	8.4	3.7	0.9
Disagree	15.1	18.5	5.5	8.5	2.8	1.5	1.4	0.5	0.3
Strongly disagree	11.7	2.6	1.3	8.9	3.5	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	14,628	7,460	9,953	9,998	13,395	11,986	12,824	11,254	10,000

Table 1b. Filial responsibility. Agreement with "Children should adjust their working lives to the needs of their parents", by country (%).

	NOR	NLD	DEU	FRA	HUN	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Strongly agree	2.2	-	4.6	4.3	31.8	3.7	6.9	13.7	23.9
Agree	10.9	-	19.8	6.8	26.6	15.0	25.5	44.1	52.1
Neither - nor	35.4	-	30.9	15.0	30.3	39.7	35.4	30.7	15.6
Disagree	28.3	-	32.8	22.1	5.7	35.5	28.3	11.0	7.9
Strongly disagree	3.8	-	11.9	51.8	5.6	6.0	3.8	0.5	0.4
Total	100.0	-	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	14,614	-	9,897	9,992	13,367	11,986	12,807	11,244	10,000

Table 1c. Filial responsibility. Agreement with "Children ought to provide financial help if parents are in financial difficulty", by country (%).

	NOR	NLD	DEU	FRA	HUN	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Strongly agree	16.2	-	8.7	28.0	30.8	18.2	19.0	21.3	36.4
Agree	27.8	-	51.1	37.4	23.0	64.5	63.7	65.4	60.6
Neither - nor	21.0	-	26.0	17.1	33.1	15.2	14.7	11.0	2.0
Disagree	15.9	-	10.6	7.3	7.0	1.9	2.3	2.1	1.0
Strongly disagree	19.1	-	3.7	10.2	6.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.0
Total	100.0	-	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	14,460	-	9,903	10,003	13,327	11,986	12,811	11,249	10,000

Table 1d. Filial responsibility. Agreement with "Children should have their parents live with them when parents can no longer look after themselves", by country (%).

	NOR	NLD	DEU	FRA	HUN	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Strongly agree	3.3	3.0	9.4	19.9	11.7	22.4	24.8	21.3	36.4
Agree	9.5	7.9	34.7	22.3	11.1	48.7	55.0	48.8	54.3
Neither - nor	14.6	24.5	33.1	24.7	29.8	23.0	16.7	21.1	6.2
Disagree	25.2	47.0	17.0	15.3	15.3	5.1	3.1	8.1	2.9
Strongly disagree	47.4	17.6	5.8	17.9	32.1	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	14,544	7,456	9,870	9,975	13,238	11,986	12,806	11,254	10,000

Table 2a. Parental responsibility. Agreement with "Parents ought to provide financial help for their adult children when the children are having financial difficulties", by country (%).

	NOR	NLD	DEU	FRA	HUN	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Strongly agree	6.9	7.1	13.4	40.0	-	17.1	14.6	12.5	30.4
Agree	31.6	26.2	53.5	37.4	-	55.8	52.3	57.4	65.8
Neither - nor	39.9	37.2	23.2	14.4	-	22.9	24.6	23.0	2.5
Disagree	15.8	25.2	7.8	4.5	-	3.6	7.7	6.5	1.2
Strongly disagree	5.9	4.3	2.2	3.8	-	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.1
Total	100.0	-	100.0	100.0	-	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	10,652	7,448	9,934	10,030	-	11,986	12,822	11,249	10,000

Table 2b. Parental responsibility. Agreement with “If their adult children were in need, parents should adjust their own lives in order to help them”, by country (%).

	NOR	**NLD**	**DEU**	**FRA**	**HUN**	**ROU**	**BGR**	**RUS**	**GEO**
Strongly agree	2.8	-	6.1	15.5	-	10.7	10.0	10.0	24.9
Agree	16.0	-	27.3	21.8	-	33.7	38.1	46.4	62.4
Neither - nor	35.5	-	30.7	21.0	-	34.5	31.4	26.7	7.2
Disgree	30.0	-	26.7	19.1	-	18.5	18.3	15.6	5.2
Strongly disagree	15.7	-	9.1	22.7	-	2.6	2.3	1.4	0.3
Total	100.0	-	100.0	100.0	-	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	10,649	-	9,892	9,957	-	11,986	12,821	11,248	10,000

Table 3. Means of variables included in regression models, by country.

Variable	NOR	NLD	DEU	FRA	HUN	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Gender	.51	.59	.54	.56	.56	.50	.55	.63	.56
Age	46.9	46.4	48.3	48.5	46.8	49.0	42.7	45.6	45.1
Higher education	.35	.34	.27	.20	.16	.10	.20	.39	.28
In labor force	.68	.57	.53	.52	.50	.44	.50	.52	.38
Mother alive	.63	.61	.59	.61	.61	.52	.67	.55	.59
Father alive	.49	.45	.44	.43	.43	.37	.52	.36	.42
Has partner	.70	.65	.66	.63	.66	.71	.67	.59	.64
Ever divorced	.16	.14	.11	.14	.15	.07	.06	.18	.02
Has children	.74	.69	.71	.75	.75	.77	.75	.80	.75
Lives w. parents	.02	.03	.05	.02	.17	.13	.26	.15	.30
Parents not together	.15	.11	.07	.15	.12	.19	.11	.16	.04
Support provision to older generations[a]	.25	-	.09	.19	-	.09	.17	.18	.15
Support provision to younger generations[b]	.30	-	.14	.22	-	.14	.17	.28	.17
Support receipt from older generations[b]	.41	-	.17	.29	-	.13	.27	.24	.23
Support receipt from younger generations[a]	.23	-	.08	.10	-	.11	.14	.20	.19

Notes: BGR=Bulgaria, GEO=Georgia, HUN=Hungary, ROU=Romania, RUS=Russia, FRA=France, DEU=Germany, NOR=Norway, NLD=The Netherlands.

Notes: [a]Types of support includes personal care, emotional support and financial assistance, [b]Types of support includes help with child care, emotional support and financial assistance.

Table 4. Multiple regression of *filial* responsibility. Unstandardised regression coefficients and standard errors, by country.

Variable	NOR	NLD*	DEU	FRA	HUN	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Gender	-0.25*** (0.015)	-0.25*** (0.019)	-0.07*** (0.016)	-0.15*** (0.020)	0.02 (0.016)	0.02* (0.010)	0.03* (0.010)	0.03* (0.012)	0.00 (0.011)
Age	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	-0.00 (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)
Higher education	0.08*** (0.016)	-0.13*** (0.020)	-0.05** (0.018)	0.05 (0.025)	0.04* (0.021)	-0.05** (0.017)	-0.05*** (0.013)	-0.02 (0.012)	-0.01 (0.012)
In labour force	-0.04* (0.017)	-0.08*** (0.022)	-0.06*** (0.017)	-0.07** (0.023)	-0.03 (0.018)	0.00 (0.012)	-0.03* (0.011)	-0.03* (0.013)	-0.03** (0.011)
Mother living	0.12*** (0.021)	-0.04 (0.026)	0.05* (0.022)	0.00 (0.027)	0.08*** (0.022)	-0.01 (0.015)	0.01 (0.015)	0.02 (0.016)	-0.01 (0.015)
Father living	0.02 (0.021)	0.06 (0.025)	0.06** (0.022)	0.01 (0.026)	0.05* (0.021)	-0.03 (0.014)	0.00 (0.013)	-0.03* (0.015)	-0.01 (0.014)
Has partner	0.01 (0.019)	-0.10*** (0.023)	-0.05** (0.018)	-0.14*** (0.023)	-0.04 (0.020)	-0.02 (0.013)	-0.01 (0.015)	0.00 (0.013)	0.03 (0.015)
Ever divorced	0.00 (0.021)	0.05 (0.029)	-0.18*** (0.026)	-0.07* (0.030)	-0.09*** (0.022)	-0.06** (0.020)	-0.08*** (0.022)	-0.02 (0.015)	-0.08* (0.037)
Has children	-0.27*** (0.021)	-0.10*** (0.025)	-0.11*** (0.019)	-0.28*** (0.027)	-0.26*** (0.024)	-0.00 (0.014)	0.04* (0.018)	-0.02 (0.017)	0.01 (0.018)
Lives w/parents	0.21*** (0.035)	0.08 (0.056)	0.17*** (0.036)	0.17* (0.071)	0.16*** (0.028)	0.09*** (0.019)	0.12*** (0.016)	0.05** (0.018)	0.05** (0.016)
Parents divorced	-0.07** (0.021)	-0.05 (0.031)	-0.14*** (0.031)	-0.09** (0.029)	-0.08** (0.024)	-0.04*** (0.013)	-0.07*** (0.016)	-0.03 (0.016)	-0.05 (0.027)
Adj. R^2	0.15	.08	.03	.05	.03	.01	.01	.003	.002
N	13,428	7,315	8,703	8,314	12,861	11,754	12,057	9,217	9,858

Notes: BGR=Bulgaria, GEO=Georgia, HUN=Hungary, ROU=Romania, RUS=Russia, FRA=France, DEU=Germany, NOR=Norway, NLD=The Netherlands.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 5. Multiple regression of *parental* responsibility. Unstandardised regression coefficients and standard errors, by country.

Variable	NOR	NLD*	DEU	FRA	ROU	BGR	RUS	GEO
Gender	-0.34*** (0.017)	-0.24*** (0.023)	-0.08*** (0.018)	-0.10*** (0.022)	0.01 (0.015)	-0.03 (0.015)	0.01 (0.016)	0.01 (0.013)
Age	0.002 (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Higher education	0.10*** (0.018)	-0.10*** (0.024)	-0.06** (0.020)	0.10*** (0.028)	-0.10*** (0.024)	-0.18*** (0.019)	-0.08*** (0.016)	0.01 (0.013)
In labour force	-0.16*** (0.020)	-0.20*** (0.022)	-0.10*** (0.019)	-0.09*** (0.025)	-0.09*** (0.017)	-0.14*** (0.016)	-0.10*** (0.018)	-0.04** (0.013)
Mother living	-0.13*** (0.024)	-0.25*** (0.026)	-0.05 (0.025)	-0.06 (0.030)	-0.04 (0.020)	-0.05* (0.022)	-0.02 (0.022)	0.00 (0.017)
Father living	-0.02 (0.022)	- 0.03 (0.030)	0.00 (0.024)	-0.08** (0.029)	-0.03 (0.019)	0.01 (0.019)	-0.02 (0.020)	0.01 (0.015)
Has partner	0.00 (0.022)	-0.06** (0.027)	-0.03 (0.020)	0.00 (0.025)	0.02 (0.019)	-0.03 (0.021)	0.02 (0.018)	0.02 (0.017)
Ever divorced	-0.10*** (0.025)	-0.04 (0.034)	-0.24*** (0.029)	-0.13*** (0.033)	-0.12*** (0.028)	-0.04 (0.032)	-0.09*** (0.020)	-0.11** (0.042)
Has children	0.04 (0.021)	-0.11*** (0.030)	0.08*** (0.022)	0.21*** (0.027)	0.09*** (0.020)	0.11*** (0.025)	0.09*** (0.020)	0.06** (0.020)
Lives w/parents	0.16* (0.074)	0.38*** (0.067)	0.17*** (0.041)	0.10 (0.078)	0.10*** (0.026)	0.11*** (0.022)	0.05 (0.025)	0.00 (0.018)
Parents divorced	0.03 (0.026)	0.18*** (0.036)	-0.02 (0.036)	0.01 (0.032)	-0.03 (0.018)	-0.07** (0.024)	-0.06** (0.021)	-0.05 (0.031)
Adj. R^2	0.06	.08	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.004
N	10,159	7,317	8,827	8,400	11,754	12,078	9,229	9,858

Notes: BGR=Bulgaria, GEO=Georgia, ROU=Romania, RUS=Russia, FRA=France, DEU=Germany, NOR=Norway, NLD=The Netherlands.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 6. Multiple regression of *filial* responsibility, including provision and receipt of support[a]. Unstandardised regression coefficients and standard errors, by country.

Variable	Norway	Germany	France	Romania	Bulgaria	Russia	Georgia
Gender	-0.25*** (0.015)	-0.08*** (0.016)	-0.14*** (0.020)	0.02 (0.010)	0.03* (0.011)	0.03* (0.012)	0.00 (0.011)
Age	-0.013*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	.002*** (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)
Higher education	0.08*** (0.016)	-0.05** (0.018)	0.05 (0.026)	-0.06** (0.017)	-0.05*** (0.013)	-0.02 (0.012)	-0.01 (0.012)
In labour force	-0.03 (0.017)	-0.06** (0.018)	-0.07** (0.023)	0.00 (0.012)	-0.03** (0.011)	-0.03* (0.013)	-0.03** (0.011)
Mother living	0.10*** (0.021)	0.05* (0.023)	0.00 (0.028)	-0.01 (0.015)	0.02 (0.015)	0.01 (0.016)	-0.01 (0.015)
Father living	0.01 (0.021)	0.06** (0.022)	0.01 (0.026)	-0.03 (0.014)	0.00 (0.013)	-0.03* (0.015)	-0.01 (0.014)
Has partner	0.01 (0.019)	-0.05* (0.018)	-0.15*** (0.023)	-0.02 (0.013)	-0.01 (0.015)	0.00 (0.013)	0.03 (0.015)
Ever divorced	0.01 (0.021)	-0.18*** (0.026)	-0.07* (0.030)	-0.06*** (0.020)	-0.07** (0.022)	-0.02 (0.015)	-0.08* (0.037)
Has children	-0.25*** (0.021)	-0.11*** (0.020)	-0.27*** (0.028)	-0.01 (0.015)	0.04* (0.017)	-0.01 (0.017)	0.01 (0.018)
Lives w/parents	0.21*** (0.054)	0.16*** (0.036)	0.17* (0.071)	0.08*** (0.019)	0.12*** (0.016)	0.05* (0.018)	0.05** (0.016)
Parents divorced	-0.07** (0.021)	-0.15*** (0.032)	-0.09** (0.029)	-0.05** (0.013)	-0.07*** (0.016)	-0.03 (0.016)	-0.05 (0.027)
Support provision to older generations	0.11*** (0.019)	-0.05 (0.028)	0.02 (0.028)	0.05** (0.018)	0.00 (0.014)	0.04* (0.015)	0.01 (0.015)
Support receipt from younger generations	-0.11*** (0.019)	0.01 (0.029)	-0.08* (0.033)	-0.00 (0.017)	-0.01 (0.015)	-0.02 (0.016)	0.01 (0.015)
Adj. R^2	.16	.03	.05	.01	.01	.004	.004
N	13,387	8,703	8,314	11,754	12,057	9,217	9,858

Notes: [a]Types of support includes personal care, emotional support and/or financial assistance.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 6. Multiple regression of *parental* responsibility, including provision and receipt of support[a]. Unstandardised regression coefficients and standard errors, by country.

Variable	Norway	Germany	France	Romania	Bulgaria	Russia	Georgia
Gender	-0.35*** (0.018)	-0.08*** (0.018)	-0.11*** (0.022)	0.00 (0.015)	-0.03 (0.015)	0.01 (0.017)	0.01 (0.013)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	.006*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Higher education	0.10*** (0.018)	-0.07** (0.021)	0.10*** (0.028)	-0.10*** (0.024)	-0.18*** (0.019)	-0.08*** (0.016)	0.01 (0.013)
In labour force	-0.16*** (0.020)	-0.10*** (0.020)	-0.08** (0.025)	-0.09*** (0.017)	-0.14*** (0.016)	-0.11*** (0.018)	-0.04** (0.013)
Mother living	-0.12*** (0.025)	-0.04 (0.026)	-0.05 (0.030)	-0.03 (0.020)	-0.05* (0.022)	0.00 (0.022)	0.01 (0.017)
Father living	-0.00 (0.024)	0.01 (0.025)	-0.07* (0.029)	-0.03 (0.019)	0.01 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.020)	0.01 (0.015)
Has partner	-0.00 (0.022)	-0.03 (0.021)	0.00 (0.025)	0.02 (0.019)	-0.02 (0.021)	0.02 (0.018)	0.02 (0.017)
Ever divorced	-0.11*** (0.025)	-0.23*** (0.030)	-0.13*** (0.033)	-0.12*** (0.027)	-0.04 (0.032)	-0.09*** (0.020)	-0.11** (0.042)
Has children	0.00 (0.025)	0.07** (0.023)	0.18*** (0.031)	0.07** (0.020)	0.10*** (0.026)	0.09*** (0.024)	0.05* (0.021)
Lives w/parents	0.14 (0.074)	0.16*** (0.042)	0.09 (0.078)	0.09*** (0.026)	0.11*** (0.022)	0.045 (0.025)	0.01 (0.018)
Parents divorced	0.03 (0.026)	-0.02 (0.037)	0.01 (0.031)	-0.03 (0.018)	-0.07** (0.024)	-0.06** (0.021)	-0.05 (0.031)
Support provision to younger generations	0.17*** (0.022)	0.12*** (0.027)	0.15*** (0.028)	0.15*** (0.021)	0.07*** (0.020)	0.07*** (0.019)	0.05** (0.017)
Support receipt from older generations	0.02 (0.022)	-0.02 (0.026)	-0.5 (0.028)	0.01 (0.022)	0.00 (0.018)	-0.07*** (0.020)	-0.05** (0.016)
Adj. R^2	.06	.03	.06	.02	.03	.03	.004
N	10,159	8,827	8,400	11,754	12,078	9,229	9,858

Notes: [a]Types of support includes help with child care, emotional support and/or financial assistance.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 8. Overview of earlier publications on filial responsibility

Publication	Country	Sample	Design	Attitudes and actual support
Dinkel (1944)	USA (Wisconsin and Minnesota)	Children (high school/college students, N = 1,324)	Cross-sectional	-
Wake and Sporakowski (1972)	USA (Illinois)	Parents and children (high school/college students, N = 446, and their parents, N = 191)	Cross-sectional	-
Seelbach (1977)	USA (Philadelphia)	Parents (low socio-economic status, N = 595)	Cross-sectional	-
Hanson et al. (1983)	USA (Wisconsin)	Adults (N = 1,950)	Cross-sectional	-
Marshall et al. (1987)	Canada (Hamilton, Ontario)	Parents (age 70+, N = 103)	Cross-sectional	-
Finley et al. (1988)	USA (Alabama)	Children (with parents 70+, N = 667)	Cross-sectional	-
Finch and Mason (1990)	England (Greater Manchester area)	Adults (N = 978)	Cross-sectional	-
Silverstein and Litwak (1993)	USA (New York City and Florida)	Parents (age 65+, N = 910)	Cross-sectional	sign. +
Wolfson et al. (1993)	Canada (Montreal)	Parents and children (in-patients aged 65+, N = 170, and their children, N = 170)	Cross-sectional	-
Lee et al. (1994)	USA (Florida)	Parents (age 65+, N = 387)	Cross-sectional	n.s.
Silverstein et al. (1995)	USA (Los Angeles)	Children (N = 521)	Longitudinal (3 waves)	T1-T2: sign.+ (sons) n.s. (daughters) T1-T3: n.s.
Logan and Spitze (1995)	USA (New York state)	Adults (age 40+, N = 1,200)	Cross-sectional	-
Eggebeen and Davey (1998)	USA	Parents (N = 1,196 aged 50+)	Longitudinal	n.s.
Lee et al. (1998)	USA (Florida)	Parents (age 65+, N = 692)	Cross-sectional	n.s.
Peek et al. (1998)	USA (Florida)	Parents (aged 65+, N = 334)	Cross-sectional	n.s.
Stein et al. (1998)	USA (Midwest)	Parents and children (middle-aged parents, N = 230, and their children, N = 230)	Cross-sectional	sign. +

Table 8 continued.

Burr and Mutchler (1999)	USA	Parents (age 55+, N = 1,698)	Cross-sectional	-
Klein Ikkink et al. (1999)	The Netherlands	Parents and children (N = 365 parents and N = 634 children)	Cross-sectional	sign. +
Daatland and Herlofson (2003)*	Norway, Germany, England, Spain and Israel (urban areas)	Old adults (age 75+, N = 1,747)	Cross-sectional	sign. + (Spain and Israel) n.s. (England, Germany and Norway)
de Valk and Schans (2008)	The Netherlands	Adults (age 50-80, N = 786 Dutch and immigrants)	Cross-sectional	-
Gans and Silverstein (2006)	USA (Los Angeles)	N=1627, G2 and G3 generation	Longitudinal (4 waves)	-
Silverstein et al. (2006)	USA (Los Angeles)	Adult Children (N = 488)	Longitudinal (2 waves)	sign.+ (daughters) n.s. (sons)
Cooney and Dykstra (2011)	USA The Netherlands	Middle-generation adults (age 40-79) N=1,232 (USA) N=792 (Netherlands)	Cross-sectional	sign.+ (USA) n.s. (Netherlands)